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Abstract
We are interested in the convergence of the value of n-stage games as n goes to
infinity and the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a general
set of states and finite sets of actions where the transition is commutative. This
means that playing an action profile a1 followed by an action profile a2, leads to
the same distribution on states as playing first the action profile a2 and then a1.
For example, absorbing games can be reformulated as commutative stochastic
games.
When there is only one player and the transition function is deterministic,
we show that the existence of a uniform value in pure strategies implies the
existence of 0-optimal strategies. In the framework of two-player stochastic
games, we study a class of games where the set of states is Rm and the transition
is deterministic and 1-Lipschitz for the L1-norm, and prove that these games
have a uniform value. A similar proof shows the existence of an equilibrium in
the non zero-sum case.
These results remain true if one considers a general model of finite repeated
games, where the transition is commutative and the players observe the past
actions but not the state.
1 Introduction
A two-player zero-sum repeated game is a game played in discrete time. At each stage,
the players independently take some decisions, which lead to an instantaneous payoff,
a lottery on a new state, and a pair of signals. Each player receives one of the signals
and the game proceeds to the next stage.
This model generalizes several models that have been studied in the literature. A
Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a repeated game with a single player, called a deci-
sion maker, who observes the state and remembers his actions. A Partial Observation
Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) is a repeated game with a single player who
observes only a signal that depends on the state and his action. A stochastic game,
introduced by Shapley [Sha53], is a repeated game where the players learn the state
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variable and past actions.
Given a positive integer n, the n-stage game is the game whose payoff is the ex-
pected average payoff during the first n stages. Under mild assumptions, it has a value,
denoted vn. One strand of the literature studies the convergence of the sequence of
n-stage values, (vn)n≥1, as n goes to infinity.
The convergence of the sequence of n-stage values is related to the behavior of
the infinitely repeated game. If the sequence of n-stage values converges to some
real number v∗, one may also consider the existence of a strategy that yields a payoff
close to v∗ in every sufficiently long game. Let v be a real number. A strategy of
player 1 guarantees v if for every η > 0 the expected average payoff in the n-stage
game is greater than v − η for every sufficiently large n and every strategy of player
2. Symmetrically, a strategy of player 2 guarantees v if for every η > 0 the expected
average payoff in the n-stage game is smaller than v + η for every sufficiently large
n and every strategy of player 1. If for every  > 0, player 1 has a strategy that
guarantees v∗ −  and player 2 has a strategy that guarantees v∗ + , then v∗ is the
uniform value. Informally, the players do not need to know the length of the game to
play well, provided the game is long enough.
At each stage, the players are allowed to chose their action randomly. If each player
can guarantee v∗ while choosing at every stage one action instead of a probability over
his actions, we say that the game has a uniform value in pure strategies.
Blackwell [Bla62] proved that an MDP with a finite set of states and a finite set
of actions has a uniform value v∗ and the decision maker has a pure strategy that
guarantees v∗. Moreover, at every stage, the optimal action depends only on the
current state. Dynkin and Jusˇkevicˇ [DJ79], and Renault [Ren11] described sufficient
conditions for the existence of the uniform value when the set of states is compact,
but in this more general setup there may not exist a strategy which guarantees the
uniform value.
Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [RSV02] proved that POMDPs with a finite set of
states, a finite set of actions, and a finite set of signals have a uniform value. Moreover,
for any ε > 0, a strategy that guarantees v∗−ε also yields a payoff close to v∗ for other
criteria of evaluation like the discounted evaluation. The existence of the uniform value
was extended by Renault [Ren11] to any space of actions and signals, provided that
at each stage only a finite number of signals can be realized.
In the framework of two-player games, Mertens and Neyman [MN81] showed the
existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a finite set of states and
finite sets of actions. Their proof relies on an algebraic argument using the finiteness
assumptions. Renault [Ren12] proved the existence of the uniform value for a two-
player game where one player controls the transition and the set of states is a compact
subset of a normed vector space.
There is an extensive literature about repeated games in which the players are
not perfectly informed about the state or the actions played. Rosenberg, Solan and
Vieille [RSV09] showed, for example, the existence of the uniform value in some class
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of games where the players observe neither the states nor the actions played by the
other players. Another particular class that is closely related to the model we con-
sider is repeated games with symmetric signals. At each stage, the players observe
the past actions played and a public signal. Kohlberg and Zamir [KZ74] and Forges
[For82] proved the existence of the uniform value, when the state is fixed once and
for all at the outset of the game. Neyman and Sorin [NS98] extended this result to
the non zero-sum case, and Geitner [Gei02] to an intermediate model where the game
is half-stochastic and half-repeated. In these four papers, the unknown information
concerns a parameter which does not change during the game. We will study models
where this parameter can change during the game.
In general, the uniform value does not exist if the players have different information.
For example, repeated games with incomplete information on both sides do not have a
uniform value [AM95]. Nevertheless, Mertens and Zamir [MZ71] [MZ80] showed that
the sequence of n-stage values converges. Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [RSV03] and
Coulomb [Cou03] showed the existence of two quantities, called the max min and the
min max, when each player observes the state and his own actions but has imperfect
monitoring of the actions of the other player. Moreover the max min where player 2
chooses his strategy knowing the strategy of player 1, only depends on the information
of player 1.
More surprisingly, the sequence (vn)n≥1 may not converge even with symmetric
information. Vigeral [Vig13] provided an example of a stochastic game with a finite
set of states and compact sets of actions where the sequence of n-stage values does
not converge. Ziliotto [Zil13] provided an example of a repeated game with a finite
set of states, finite sets of actions, and a finite set of public signals where a similar
phenomenon occurs. In each case, the game has no uniform value.
In this paper, we are interested in two-player zero-sum stochastic games where the
transition is commutative. In such games, given a sequence of decisions, the order is
irrelevant to determine the resulting state: playing an action profile a1 followed by an
action profile a2 leads to the same distribution over states as playing first the action
profile a2 and then a1.
In game theory, several models satisfy this assumption. For example, Aumann and
Maschler [AM95] studied repeated games with incomplete information on one side.
One can introduce an auxiliary stochastic game where the new state space is the set
of beliefs of the uninformed player and the sets of actions are the mixed actions of
the original game. This game is commutative as we will show in Example 2.4. We
will also show in Proposition 5.1 that absorbing games (see Kohlberg [Koh74]) can be
reformulated as commutative stochastic games.
In Theorem 3.1 we prove that whenever a commutative MDP with a deterministic
transition has a uniform value in pure strategies, the decision maker has a strategy
that guarantees the value. Example 4.1 shows that to guarantee the value, the deci-
sion maker may need to choose his actions randomly. Under topological assumptions
similar to Renault [Ren11], we show that the conclusion can be strengthened to the
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existence of a strategy without randomization that guarantees the value. By a stan-
dard argument, we deduce the existence of a strategy that guarantees the value in
commutative POMDPs where the decision maker has no information on the state.
In Theorem 3.6 we prove that a two-player zero-sum stochastic game in which the
set of states is a compact subset of Rm, the sets of actions are finite, and each tran-
sition is a deterministic function that is 1-Lipschitz for the norm ‖.‖1, has a uniform
value. We deduce the existence of the uniform value in commutative state-blind re-
peated games where at each stage the players learn the past actions played but not
the state. In this case, we can define an auxiliary stochastic game on a compact set of
states, which satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3.6. Therefore, this auxiliary game
has a uniform value and we deduce the existence of the uniform value in the original
state-blind repeated game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal definition
of commutativity, the model of stochastic games, and the model of state-blind repeated
games. In Section 3, we state the results. Section 4 is dedicated to several results on
Markov Decision Processes. We first provide an example of a commutative determin-
istic MDP with a uniform value in pure strategies but no pure 0-optimal strategies.
Then we prove Theorem 3.1. In Section 5, we focus on the results in the framework
of stochastic games and the proof of Theorem 3.6. We first show that another widely
studied class of games, called absorbing game, can be reformulated into the class of
commutative games. Then we prove Theorem 3.6 and deduce the existence of the
uniform value in commutative state-blind repeated games. Finally, we provide some
extensions of Theorem 3.6. Especially, we show the existence of a uniform equilibrium
in two-player non zero-sum state-blind commutative repeated games and m-player
state-blind product-state commutative repeated games.
2 The model
When X is a non-empty set, we denote by ∆f (X) the set of probabilities on X with
finite support. When X is finite, we denote the set of probabilities on X by ∆(X) and
by ]X the cardinality of X. We will consider two types of games: stochastic games
on a compact metric set X of states, denoted by Γ = (X, I, J, q, g), and state-blind
repeated games on a finite set K of states1, denoted by Γsb = (K, I, J, q, g). The sets
of actions will always be finite. Finite sets will be given the discrete topology. We
first define stochastic games and the notion of uniform value. We will then describe
state-blind repeated games.
2.1 Commutative stochastic games
A two-player zero-sum stochastic game Γ = (X, I, J, q, g) is given by a non-empty
set of states X, two finite, non-empty sets of actions I and J , a reward function
1We use X to denote a general set of states and K to denote a finite set of states
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g : X × I × J → [0, 1] and a transition function q : X × I × J → ∆f (X).
Given an initial probability distribution z1 ∈ ∆f (X), the game Γ(z1) is played as
follows. An initial state x1 is drawn according to z1 and announced to the players.
At each stage t ≥ 1, player 1 and player 2 choose simultaneously actions, it ∈ I and
jt ∈ J . Player 2 pays to player 1 the amount g(xt, it, jt) and a new state xt+1 is drawn
according to the probability distribution q(xt, it, jt). Then, both players observe the
action pair (it, jt) and the state xt+1. The game proceeds to stage t + 1. When the
initial distribution is a Dirac mass at x1 ∈ X, denoted by δx1 , we denote by Γ(x1) the
game Γ(δx1).
If for every initial state and every action pair, the image of q is a Dirac measure,
q is said to be deterministic.
Note that we assume that the transition maps to the set of probabilities with fi-
nite support on X: given a stage, a state and an action pair, there exists a finite
number of states possible at the next stage. We equip X with any σ-algebra X that
includes all countable sets. When (X, d) is a metric space, the Borel σ-algebra suffices.
For all i ∈ I and j ∈ J we extend q(·, i, j) and g(·, i, j) linearly to ∆f (X) by
∀z ∈ ∆f (X), q˜(z, i, j) =
∑
x∈X
z(x)q(x, i, j) and g˜(z, i, j) =
∑
x∈X
z(x)g(x, i, j).
Definition 2.1 The transition q is commutative on X if for all x ∈ X, for all i, i′ ∈ I
and for all j, j′ ∈ J ,
q˜(q(x, i, j), i′, j′) = q˜(q(x, i′, j′), i, j).
That is, the distribution over the state after two stages is equal whether action pair
(i, j) is played before (i′, j′) or whether (i, j) is played after (i′, j′). Note that if the
transition q is not deterministic, q˜(q(x, i′, j′), i, j) is the law of a random variable x′′
computed in two steps: x′ is randomly chosen with law q(x, i′, j′), then x′′ is randomly
chosen with law q(x′, i, j); specifically (i, j) is played at the second step independently
of the outcome of x′.
Remark 2.2 If the transition q does not depend on the actions, then the state process
is a Markov chain and the commutativity assumption is automatically fulfilled.
Example 2.3 Let X be the set of complex numbers of modulus 1 and α : I × J →
∆f ([0, 2pi]). Let q be defined by
∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ I,∀b ∈ J, q(x, a, b) =
∑
ρ∈[0,2pi]
α(a, b)(ρ)δxeiρ .
If the state is x and the action pair (a, b) is played, then the new state is x′ = xeiρ
with probability f(a, b)(ρ). This transition is commutative by the commutativity of
multiplication of complex numbers.
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The next example originates in the theory of repeated games with incomplete
information on one side (Aumann and Maschler [AM95]).
Example 2.4 A repeated game with incomplete information on one side, Γ, is defined
by a finite family of matrices (Gk)k∈K , two finite sets of actions I and J , and an initial
probability p1. At the outset of the game, a matrix G
k is randomly chosen with law
p1 and told to player 1 whereas player 2 only knows p1. Then, the matrix game G
k is
repeated over and over. The players observe the actions played but not the payoff.
One way to study Γ is to introduce a stochastic game on the posterior beliefs of
player 2 about the state. Knowing the strategy played by player 1, player 2 updates
his posterior belief depending on the actions observed. Let Ψ = (X,A,B, q˜, g˜) be a
stochastic game where X = ∆(K), A = ∆(I)K and B = ∆(J), the payoff function is
given by
g˜(p, a, b) =
∑
k∈K,i∈I,j∈J
pkak(i)b(j)Gk(i, j),
and the transition by
q˜(p, a, b) =
∑
k∈K,i∈I
ak(i)δpˆ(a|i),
where a(i) =
∑
k∈K p
kak(i) and pˆ(a|i) =
(
pkak(i)
a(i)
)
k∈K
∈ ∆(K). Knowing the mixed
action chosen by player 1 in each state, a, and having a prior belief, p, player 2
observes action i with probability a(i) and updates his beliefs by Bayes rule to pˆ(a|i).
This induces the auxiliary transition q˜. The payoff g˜ is the expectation of the payoff
under the probability generated by player 2’s belief and player 1’s mixed action.
We now check that the auxiliary stochastic game is commutative. Note that the
second player does not influence the transition so we can ignore him. Let a and a′ be
two actions of player 1 and p be a belief of player 2. If player 1 plays first a and player
2 observes action i, then player 2’s belief p2(·|i) is given by
∀k ∈ K, p2(k|i) = p
kak(i)∑
k∈K p
kak(i)
.
If now player 1 plays a′ and player 2 observes i′, then player 2’s belief p3(·|i, i′) is given
by
∀k ∈ K, p3(k|i, i′) = p2(k|i)a
′k(i′)∑
k∈K p2(k|i)a′k(i′)
=
pka′k(i′)ak(i)∑
k∈K p
ka′k(i′)ak(i)
.
The probability that the action pair (i, i′) is observed is pkak(i)a′k(i′). Since the belief
p3 and the probability to observe each pair (i, i
′) are symmetric in (a, i) and (a′, i′),
the transition is commutative.
Remark 2.5 Both previous examples are commutative but the transition is not de-
terministic.
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Remark 2.6 Commutativity of the transitions implies that if we consider an initial
state x and a finite sequence of actions (i1, j1, ...., in, jn), then the law of the state at
stage n+ 1 does not depend on the order in which the action pairs (it, jt), t = 1, ..., n,
are played. We can thus represent a finite sequence of actions by a vector in NI×J
counting how many times each action pair is played. Other models in which the
transition along a sequence of actions is only a function of a parameter in a smaller
set have been studied in the literature. For example, a transition is state independent
(SIT) if it does not depend on the state. The law of the state at stage n is characterized
only by the last action pair played. The law then depends on the order in which actions
are played. Thuijsman [Thu92] proved the existence of stationary optimal strategies
in this framework.
2.2 Uniform value
At stage t, the space of past histories is Ht = (X×I×J)t−1×X. Set H∞ = (X×I×J)∞
to be the space of infinite plays. For every t ≥ 1, we consider the product topology on
Ht, t ≥ 1 and also on H∞.
A (behavioral) strategy for player 1 is a sequence (σt)t≥1 of functions σt : Ht →
∆(I). A (behavorial) strategy for player 2 is a sequence τ = (τt)t≥1 of functions
τt : Ht → ∆(J). We denote by Σ and T , the player’s respective sets of strategies.
Note that we did not make any measurability assumption on the strategies. Given
x1 ∈ X, the set of histories at stage t from state x1 is finite since the image of the
transition q is contained in the set of probabilities over X with finite support and the
sets of actions are finite. It follows that any triplet (z1, σ, τ) defines a probability over
Ht without an additional measurability condition. This sequence of probabilities can
be extended to a unique probability denoted Pz1,σ,τ over the set H∞ with the infinite
product topology. We denote by Ez1,σ,τ the expectation with respect to the probability
Pz1,σ,τ .
If for every t ≥ 1 and every history h ∈ Ht the image of σt(ht) is a Dirac measure,
the strategy is said to be pure. If the initial distribution is a Dirac measure, the
transition is deterministic and both players use pure strategies, then Pz1,σ,τ is a Dirac
measure. The strategies induce a unique play.
The game we described is a game with perfect recall, so that by Kuhn’s theorem
[Kuh53] every behavior strategy is equivalent to a probability over pure strategies,
called mixed strategy, and vice versa.
We are going to focus on two types of evaluations, the n-stage expected payoff and
the expected average payoff between two stages m and n. For each positive integer n,
the expected average payoff for player 1 up to stage n, induced by the strategy pair
(σ, τ) and the initial distribution z1, is given by
γn(z1, σ, τ) = Ez1,σ,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
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The expected average payoff between two stages 1 ≤ m ≤ n is given by
γm,n(z1, σ, τ) = Ez1,σ,τ
(
1
n−m+ 1
n∑
t=m
g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
To study the infinitely repeated game Γ(z1), we focus on the notion of uniform value
and on the notion of ε-optimal strategies.
Definition 2.7 Let v be a real number.
• Player 1 can guarantee v in Γ(z1) if for all ε > 0 there exists a strategy σ∗ ∈ Σ
of player 1 such that
lim inf
n
inf
τ∈T
γn(z1, σ
∗, τ) ≥ v − ε.
We say that such a strategy σ∗ guarantees v − ε in Γ(z1).
• Player 2 can guarantee v in Γ(z1) if for all ε > 0 there exists a strategy τ ∗ ∈ T
of player 2 such that
lim sup
n
sup
σ∈Σ
γn(z1, σ, τ
∗) ≤ v + ε.
We say that such a strategy τ ∗ guarantees v + ε in Γ(z1).
• If both players can guarantee v, then v is called the uniform value of the game
Γ(z1) and denoted by v
∗(z1). A strategy σ (resp. τ) that guarantees v∗(z1) − ε
(resp. v∗(z1) + ) with ε ≥ 0 is called ε-optimal.
Remark 2.8 For each n ≥ 1 the triplet (Σ, T , γn(z1, ., .)) defines a game in strategic
form. This game has a value, denoted by vn(z1). If the game Γ(z) has a uniform value
v∗(z1), then the sequence (vn(z1))n≥1 converges to v∗(z1).
Remark 2.9 Let us make several remarks on another way to evaluate the infinite
stream of payoffs. Let λ ∈ (0, 1]. The expected λ-discounted payoff for player 1,
induced by a strategy pair (σ, τ) and the initial distribution z1, is given by
γλ(z1, σ, τ) = Ez1,σ,τ
(
λ
∞∑
t=1
(1− λ)(t−1)g(xt, it, jt)
)
.
For each λ ∈ (0, 1], the triplet (Σ, T , γλ(z1, ., .)) also defines a game Γλ(z1) in strategic
form. The sets of strategies are compact for the product topology, and the payoff
function γλ(z1, σ, τ) is continuous. Using Kuhn’s theorem, the payoff is also concave-
like, convex-like and it follows therefore from Fan’s minimax theorem (see [Fan53])
that the game Γλ(z1) has a value, denoted vλ(z1). Note that there may not exist an
optimal measurable strategy which depends only on the current state (Levy [Lev12]).
Some authors focus on the existence of v(z1) such that
lim
n→∞
vn(z1) = lim
λ→0
vλ(z1) = v(z1).
When the uniform value exists, this equality is immediately true with v(z1) = v
∗(z1)
since the discounted payoff can be written as a convex combination of expected average
payoffs.
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2.3 The model of repeated games with state-blind players
A state-blind repeated game Γsb = (K, I, J, q, g) is defined by the same objects as a
stochastic game. The definition of commutativity is the same. The main difference is
the information that the players have, which affects their sets of strategies. We assume
that at each stage, the players observe the actions played but not the state. We will
restrict the discussion to a finite state space K.
Given an initial probability p1 ∈ ∆(K), the game Γsb(p1) is played as follows.
An initial state k1 is drawn according to p1 without being announced to the players.
At each stage t ≥ 1, player 1 and player 2 choose simultaneously an action, it ∈ I
and jt ∈ J . Player 1 receives the (unobserved) payoff g(kt, it, jt), player 2 receives
the (unobserved) payoff −g(kt, it, jt), and a new state kt+1 is drawn according to the
probability distribution q(kt, it, jt). Both players then observe only the action pair
(it, jt) and the game proceeds to stage t+ 1.
Since the states are not observed, the space of public histories of length t is Hsbt =
(I × J)t−1. A strategy of player 1 in Γsb is a sequence (σt)t≥1 of functions σt : Hsbt →
∆(I), and a strategy of player 2 is a sequence τ = (τt)t≥1 of functions τt : Hsbt →
∆(J). We denote by Σsb and T sb the players respective sets of strategies. An initial
distribution p1 and a pair of strategies (σ, τ) ∈ Σsb × T sb induce a unique probability
over the infinite plays H∞. For every pair of strategies (σ, τ) and initial probability p1
the payoff is defined as in Section 2.2. Similarly, the notion of uniform value is defined
as in Definition 2.7 by restricting the players to play strategies in Σsb and T sb.
Definition 2.10 Let v be a real number.
• Player 1 can guarantee v in Γsb(p1) if for all ε > 0 there exists a strategy σ∗ ∈ Σsb
of player 1 such that
lim inf
n
inf
τ∈T sb
γn(p1, σ
∗, τ) ≥ v − ε.
We say that such a strategy σ∗ guarantees v − ε in Γsb(p1).
• Player 2 can guarantee v in Γsb(p1) if for all ε > 0 there exists a strategy τ ∗ ∈ T sb
of player 2 such that
lim sup
n
sup
σ∈Σsb
γn(p1, σ, τ
∗) ≤ v + ε.
We say that such a strategy τ ∗ guarantees v + ε in Γsb(p1).
• If both players can guarantee v, then v is called the uniform value of the game
Γsb(p1) and denoted by v
sb(p1).
Remark 2.11 The sets Σsb and T sb can be seen as subsets of Σ and T respectively.
There is no relation between vsb(p1) and v
∗(p1), since both players have restricted sets
of strategies.
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3 Results.
In this section we present the main results of the paper. Section 3.1 concerns MDPs
and Section 3.2 concerns stochastic games.
3.1 Existence of 0-optimal strategies in Commutative deter-
ministic Markov Decision Processes.
An MDP is a stochastic game, Γ = (X, I, q, g), with a single player, that is, the set
J is a singleton. Our first main result states that if an MDP with deterministic and
commutative transitions has a uniform value and if the decision maker has pure -
optimal strategies, then he also has a (not necessarily pure) 0-optimal strategy. We
also provide sufficient topological conditions for the existence of a pure 0-optimal
strategy.
Theorem 3.1 Let Γ = (X, I, q, g) be an MDP such that I is finite and q is determin-
istic and commutative.
1. If for all z1 ∈ ∆f (X), Γ(z1) has a uniform value in pure strategies, then for all
z1 ∈ ∆f (X) there exists a 0-optimal strategy.
2. If X is a precompact metric space, q(·, i) is 1-Lipschitz for every i ∈ I, and g(·, i)
is uniformly continuous for every i ∈ I, then for all z1 ∈ ∆f (X) the game Γ(z1)
has a uniform value and there exists a 0-optimal pure strategy.
Remark 3.2 In an MDP with a deterministic transition, a play is uniquely deter-
mined by the initial state and a sequence of actions. Thus, in the framework of
deterministic MDPs we will always identify the set of pure strategies with the set of
sequences of actions.
The first part of Theorem 3.1 is sharp in the sense that a commutative deterministic
MDP with a uniform value in pure strategies may have no 0-optimal pure strategy.
An example is described at the beginning of Section 4.
The topological assumptions of the second part of Theorem 3.1 were first introduced
by Renault [Ren11] and imply the existence of the uniform value in pure strategies;
by the first part of the theorem they also imply the existence of a 0-optimal strategy.
Under these topological assumptions, we prove the stronger result of the existence of
a 0-optimal pure strategy.
Let us now discuss the topological assumptions made in Theorem 3.1. First, if the
payoff function g is only continuous or the state space is not precompact, then the
uniform value may fail to exist as shown in the following example.
Example 3.3 Consider a Markov Decision Process (X, I, q, g) where there is only one
action, |I| = 1. The set of states is the set of integers, X = N, and the transition
is given by q(n) = n + 1, ∀n ∈ N. Note that q is commutative and deterministic.
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Let r = (rn)n∈N be a sequence of numbers in [0, 1] such that the sequence of average
payoffs does not converge. The payoff function is defined by g(n) = rn,∀n ∈ N.
We consider the following metric on N : for all n,m ∈ N, d(n,m) = 1n6=m. Then
(N, d) is not precompact, the transition q is 1-Lipschitz, and the function g is uniformly
continuous. The choice of r implies that the MDP Γ = (X, I, q, g) has no uniform value.
Consider now the following metric on N : for all n,m ∈ N, d′(n,m) = | 1
n+1
− 1
m+1
|.
Then (N, d′) is a precompact metric space, the transition is 1-Lipschitz and the function
g is continuous. As before, the MDP Γ = (X, I, q, g) has no uniform value. A simple
computation shows that the function g is not uniformly continuous on (N, d′). Take
now g a uniformly continuous function, then (g(n))n∈N is a Cauchy sequence in a
complete space, thus converges. It follows that the sequence of Cesa`ro averages also
converges to the same limit and the game has a uniform value.
The assumption that q is 1-Lipschitz may seem strong but turns out to be necessary
in the proof of Renault [Ren11]. The reason is as follows. When computing the uniform
value, one considers infinite histories. When q is 1-Lipschitz, given two states x and
x′ and an infinite sequence of actions (i1, ..., it, ...), the state at stage t on the play
from x and the state at stage t on the play from x′ are at a distance at most d(x, x′).
Thus, the payoffs along both plays stay close at every stage. On the contrary, if q were
say 2-Lipschitz, we only know that the distance between the state at stage t on the
play from x and the state at stage t on the play from x′ is at most d(x, x′)2t, which
gives no uniform bound on the difference between the stage payoffs along the two
plays. As shown in Renault [Ren11] when q is not 1-Lipschitz, the value may fail to
exist. The counter-example provided by Renault is not commutative and it might be
that the additional assumption of commutativity can help us in relaxing the Lipschitz
requirement on q. In our proof, we use the fact that q is 1-Lipschitz at two steps:
first in order to apply the result of Renault [Ren11] and then in order to concatenate
strategies. It is still open whether one of these two steps can be done under the weaker
assumption that q is uniformly continuous.
We list now two open problems: assume that the uniform value exists, X is pre-
compact, g is uniformly continuous, and q is uniformly continuous, deterministic, and
commutative; does there exist a 0-optimal strategy? Does an MDP with X precom-
pact, g uniformly continuous, and q uniformly continuous, deterministic, and commu-
tative always have a uniform value?
We deduce from Theorem 3.1 the existence of a 0-optimal strategy for commutative
POMDPs with no information on the state, called MDPs in the dark in the literature.
The auxiliary MDP associated to the POMDP is deterministic and commutative, and
thus it satisfies the assumption of Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.4 Let Γsb = (K, I, q, g) be a commutative state-blind POMDP with a
finite state space K and a finite set of actions I. For all p1 ∈ ∆(K), the POMDP
Γsb(p1) has a uniform value and there exists a 0-optimal pure strategy.
We will prove Corollary 3.4 in the two-player framework.
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Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille [RSV02] asked if a 0-optimal strategy exists in
POMDPs. Theorem 3.1 ensures that if the transition is commutative such a strat-
egy exists. The following example, communicated by Hugo Gimbert, shows that it is
not true without the commutativity assumption. The example also implies that there
exist games that cannot be transformed into a commutative game with finite sets of
actions.
Example 3.5 Consider a state-blind POMDP Γsb = (X, I, g, q) defined as follows.
There are four states X = {α, β, k0, k1} and two actions I = {T,B}. The payoff is 0
except in state k1 where it is 1. The states k0 and k1 are absorbing and the transition
function q is given on the other states by
q(α, T ) =
1
2
δα +
1
2
δβ,
q(β, T ) = δβ,
q(α,B) = δk0 ,
q(β,B) = δk1 .
This POMDP is not commutative: if the initial state is α and the decision maker plays
B and then T , the state is k0 with probability one, whereas if he plays first T and
then B, the state is k0 with probability 1/2 and k1 with probability 1/2.
Let us check that this game has a uniform value in pure strategies, but no 0-optimal
strategies. An ε-optimal strategy in Γ(α) is to play the action T until the probability
to be in β is more than 1− ε, and then to play B. This leads to a payoff of 1− ε, so
the uniform value in α exists and is equal to 1. The reader can verify that there is no
strategy that guarantees 1 in Γ(α).
3.2 Existence of the uniform value in commutative determin-
istic stochastic games.
For two-player stochastic games, the commutativity assumption does not imply the
existence of 0-optimal strategies. Indeed, we will prove in Proposition 5.1 that any
absorbing game can be reformulated as a commutative stochastic game. Since there
exist absorbing games with deterministic transitions without 0-optimal strategies, for
example the Big Match (see Blackwell and Ferguson [BF68]), there exist deterministic
commutative stochastic games with a uniform value and without 0-optimal strategies.
In this section, we study the existence of the uniform value in one class of stochastic
games on Rm.
Theorem 3.6 Let Γ = (X, I, J, q, g) be a stochastic game where X is a compact subset
of Rm, I and J are finite sets, q is commutative, deterministic and 1-Lipschitz for the
norm ‖.‖1, and g is continuous. Then for all z1 ∈ ∆f (X) the stochastic game Γ(z1)
has a uniform value.
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Let us comment on the assumptions of Theorem 3.6. The state space is not finite
yet the set of actions available to each player is the same in all states. This requirement
is necessary to ensure that the commutativity property is well defined. Our proof is
valid only if q is 1-Lipschitz with respect to the norm ‖.‖1. Thus this theorem does not
apply to Example 2.3 on the circle. The proof can be adapted for polyhedral norms
(i.e. such that the unit ball has a finite number of extreme points), this is further
discussed in Section 5.4. Finally note that the most restrictive assumptions are on the
transition.
As shown in the MDP framework, the assumption that q is 1-Lipschitz is important
for the existence of a uniform value and is used in the proof at two steps. First, we use
it to deduce that for all (i, j) ∈ I × J , iterating infinitely often the action pair (i, j)
leads to a limit cycle with a finite number of states. Second, it is used to prove that if
a strategy guarantees w from a state x then it guarantees almost w in any game that
starts at an initial state in a small neighbourhood of x.
Given a state-blind repeated game Γsb = (K, I, J, q, g) with a commutative transi-
tion q, we define the auxiliary stochastic game Ψ = (X, I, J, q˜, g˜) where X = ∆(K), q˜
is the linear extension of q, and g˜ is the linear extension of g.
Since K is finite, X can be embedded in RK and the transition q˜ is deterministic,
1-Lipschitz for ‖.‖1, and commutative. Furthermore, g˜ is continuous and therefore we
can apply Theorem 3.6 to Ψ. It follows that for each initial state p1 ∈ X, Ψ(p1) has a
uniform value. We will check that it is the uniform value of the state-blind repeated
game Γsb(p1) and deduce the following corollary.
Corollary 3.7 Let Γsb = (K, I, J, q, g) be a commutative state-blind repeated game
with a finite set of states K and finite sets of actions I and J . For all p1 ∈ ∆(K), the
game Γsb(p1) has a uniform value.
Remark 3.8 Corollary 3.7 concerns repeated games where the players observe past
actions but not the state. The more general model, where the players observe past
actions and have a public signal on the state, leads to the definition of an auxiliary
stochastic game with a random transition. In the deterministic case given a triplet
(z1, σ, τ), the sequence of states visited along each infinite play converges to a finite
cycle Pz1,σ,τ -almost surely. This no longer holds if the transition is random.
We now present an example of a commutative state-blind repeated game and its
auxilliary deterministic stochastic game.
Example 3.9 Let K = Z/mZ and f be a function from I × J to ∆(K). We define
the transition q : K × I × J → ∆(K) as follows: given a state k ∈ K, if the players
play (i, j) then for all k′ ∈ K, the new state is k + k′ with probability f(i, j)(k′).
If the initial state is drawn with a distribution p and players play respectively i
and j, then the new state is given by the sum of two independent random variables
of respective laws p and f(i, j). The addition of independent random variables is a
commutative and associative operation, therefore q is commutative on K.
For example, let m = 3, I = {T,B}, J = {L,R} and the function f be given by
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L R
T
B
(
1
2
δ1 +
1
2
δ2 δ1
δ1 δ0
)
.
If the players play (T, L) then the new state is one of the two other states with equal
probability. If the players play (B,R), then the state does not change. And otherwise
the state goes from state k to state k + 1.
The extension of the transition function to the set of probabilities over K is given
by
q˜((p1, p2, p3), T, L) =
(
p2+p3
2
, p
1+p3
2
, p
1+p2
2
)
,
q˜((p1, p2, p3), B,R) = (p1, p2, p3),
q˜((p1, p2, p3), B, L) = q˜((p1, p2, p3), T, R) = (p3, p1, p2).
4 Existence of 0-optimal strategies in commutative
deterministic MDPs.
In this section we focus on MDPs and Theorem 3.1. The section is divided into four
parts. In the first part we provide an example showing that under the conditions of
Theorem 3.1(1), there need not exist a pure 0-optimal strategy.
The rest of the section is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 3.1. In the second part
we show that in a deterministic commutative MDP, for all ε > 0, there exist ε-optimal
pure strategies such that the uniform value is constant on the play. Along these
strategies, the decision maker ensures that when balancing between current payoff
and future states, he is not making irreversible mistakes, in the sense that the uniform
value does not decrease along the induced play.
In the third part we prove Theorem 3.1(1). To prove the existence of a (non-
pure) 0-optimal strategy, we first show the existence of pure strategies such that the
lim sup of the long run expected average payoffs is the uniform value. Nevertheless the
payoffs may not converge along the play induced by these strategies. We show that
the decision maker can choose a proper distribution over these strategies to ensure
that the expected average payoff converges.
The fourth part is dedicated to the proof of Theorem 3.1(2). To construct a pure
0-optimal strategy, instead of concatenating strategies one after the other, as is often
done in the literature, we define a sequence of strategies (σl)l≥1 such that for every
l ≥ 1, σl guarantees v∗(xl)−εl where xl ∈ X and εl is a positive real number. We then
split these strategies, seen as sequences of actions, into blocks of actions and construct
a 0-optimal strategy by playing these blocks in a proper order.
4.1 An example of a commutative deterministic MDP with-
out 0-optimal pure strategies
In this section, we provide an example of a commutative deterministic MDP with a
uniform value in pure strategies that does not have a pure 0-optimal strategy. Before
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going into the details, we outline the structure of the example. The set of states, which
is the countable set N×N, is partitioned into countably many sets, {h0, h1, ...}, such
that the payoff is constant on each element of the partition; the payoff is 0 on the set
h0 and 1− 1
2l
on the set hl, for all l ≥ 1. We will first check that for each l ≥ 1, there
exists a pure strategy from the initial state (0, 0) that eventually belongs to the set
hl. This will imply that the game starting at (0, 0) has a uniform value equal to 1.
We will then prove that any 0-optimal pure strategy has to visit all sets hl and that
when switching from one set hi to another set hi
′
, the induced play has to spend many
stages in the set h0. The computation of the minimal number of stages spent in the
set h0 shows that the average expected payoff has to drop below 1
2
, which contradicts
the optimality of the strategy. Thus, there exists no 0-optimal pure strategy in the
game starting at state (0, 0).
Example 4.1 The set of states is X = N×N and there are only two actions R and
T ; the action R increments the first coordinate and the action T increments the second
one:
q((x, y), R) = (x+ 1, y),
q((x, y), T ) = (x, y + 1).
Plainly the transition is deterministic and commutative.
For each l ≥ 1, let wl = ∑lm=1 (4m−1 − 1) = 4l−13 − l. We define the set hl ⊂ X by
hl = {(wl, 0)} ∪
{
(x, y), wl + (y − 1) (4l−1 − 1) ≤ x ≤ wl + y (4l−1 − 1) , x, y ≥ 1} .
For example
h1 = {(0, y), y ≥ 0},
and
h2 = {(3, 0)} ∪ (∪y≥1{(3y, y), (3y + 1, y), (3y + 2, y), (3y + 3, y)}) .
For every l ≥ 1, the set hl is the set of states obtained along the play induced by the
sequence of actions (TR4
l−1−1)∞ from state (wl, 0). We denote by h0 the set of states
not on any hl, l ≥ 1. Figure (1) shows the play associated to h1, h2, and h3 with their
respective payoffs. One can notice that the plays following these three sets separate
from each other.
The payoff is 1− 1
2l
in every state on the set hl and 0 on the set h0 :
g (x, y) =
{
1− 1
2l
if x ∈ [wl + (y − 1) (4l−1 − 1) , wl + y (4l−1 − 1)]
0 otherwise.
The uniform value exists in every state, is equal to 1, and the decision maker has
ε-optimal pure strategies: given an initial state, play R until reaching some state in hl
with 1
2l
≤ ε and then stay in hl.
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Figure 1: Payoff of the game on h1,h2 and h3.
There exists no 0-optimal pure strategy from state (0, 0). Since there is only one
player, the transition is deterministic and the payoff depends only on the state, we can
identify a pure strategy with the sequence of states it selects on the play that it defines.
Let h = (z1, ..., zt, ...) be a 0-optimal strategy. Since the play h guarantees 1, there
exists an increasing sequence of stages (nl)l≥1 such that h crosses hl at stage nl.
Let ml < nl+1 be the last time before nl+1 such that h intersects h
l. The reader can
check that then nl+1−ml ≥ ml, and every state of h between stage ml+1 and stage nl+1
is in h0. Therefore the expected average payoff at stage nl+1−1 is less 12×1+ 12×0 = 12 .
We now argue that there is a behavioral strategy that yields payoff 1. We start by
illustrating a strategy that yields an expected average payoff at least 3
8
in all stages:
• with probability 1/4, the decision maker plays 3 times Right in order to reach the
set h2 and then stays in h2;
• with probability 1/4, the decision maker stays in the set h1 for 3 stages (3 times
Top) then plays 9 times Right in order to reach the set h2 and then stays in h2;
• with probability 1/4, the decision maker stays in the set h1 for 3 + 9 = 12 stages
then plays 36 times Right in order to reach the set h2 and then stays in h2;
• with probability 1/4 the decision maker stays in the set h1 for 3 + 9 + 36 = 48
stages then plays 144 times Right in order to reach the set h2 and then stays in
h2.
Note that the state at stage 192 is on h2 and more precisely equal to (48, 144)
whatever is the pure strategy chosen. The first strategy yields a payoff of 3/4 except on
the second and third times the decision maker is playing right (stage 2-3), the second
one yields a payoff of 1/2 before stage 3 (included) and a payoff of 3/4 from stages 13
(included), the third one yields a payoff of 1/2 before stage 12 (included) and a payoff
of 3/4 from stage 49 (included) and the fourth one yields a payoff of 1/2 before stage
48 (included) and a payoff of 3/4 from stages 193 (included).
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Thus for each stage n up to stage 192, there is at most one of the four pure strate-
gies that gives a daily payoff of 0. The others strategies either stay in h1 or stay in h2,
and thus yield a stage payoff at least 1/2. Therefore, the expected payoff at each stage
is greater than 3
4
∗ 1
2
= 3
8
and the expected average payoff until stage n is greater than
3/8 for every n ≥ 1. We managed to build a strategy going from h1 to the set h2 such
that the expected average payoff does not drop below 3
8
.
We can iterate and switch from h2 to h3 without the payoff dropping below 7
8
∗ 3
4
by considering 8 different pure strategies. Repeating this procedure from hl to hl+1
for every l ≥ 1 will lead to a 0-optimal strategy. To define properly a strategy which
ensures an expected payoff 1, we augment the strategy as in Section 4.3.
4.2 Existence of ε-optimal strategies with a constant value on
the induced play
In this part, we consider a commutative deterministic MDP with a uniform value in
pure strategies. We show that for all x1 ∈ X and all ε > 0 there exists an ε-optimal
pure strategy in Γ(x1) such that the value is constant on the induced play. Lehrer
and Sorin [LS92] showed that in deterministic MDPs, given a sequence of actions, the
value is always non-increasing along the induced play. In particular, it is true along
the play induced by an ε-optimal pure strategy. We need to define an ε-optimal pure
strategy such that the value is non-decreasing.
To this end, we introduce a partial preorder on the set of states such that, if x′ is
greater than x, then x′ can be reached from x, i.e. there exists a finite sequence of
actions such that x′ is on one play induced from x. Fix a state x1 and let x be a state
which can be reached from x1. By commutativity, the order of actions is not relevant
and we can represent the state x by a vector m ∈ NI , counting how many times each
action has to be played in order to reach x from x1. Let M(x) be the set of all vectors
representing the state x.
Given two vectors m and m′ in RI , m is greater than m′ if for every i ∈ I,
m(i) ≥ m′(i). Given two states x and x′, we say that x is greater than x′, denoted
x ≥ x′, if there exists m ∈M(x) and m′ ∈M(x′), such that m ≥ m′. By construction,
x ≥ x′ implies that x can be reached from the state x′. Indeed if x is greater than x′,
then there exists m ∈M(x) and m′ ∈M(x′) such that m ≥ m′ in all coordinates. By
playing (m −m′)(i) times the action i for every i ∈ I, the decision maker can reach
the state x from x′.
Lemma 4.2 Consider a commutative deterministic MDP with a uniform value in
pure strategies. For all x1 ∈ X and all ε > 0 there exists an ε-optimal strategy in
Γ(x1) such that the value is non-decreasing, thus constant, on the induced play.
Proof: Fix x1 ∈ X and ε > 0. We construct a sequence of real numbers (εl)l≥1 and
a sequence of strategies (σl)l≥1 satisfying three properties. For each l ≥ 1, we denote
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by (xln)n≥1 the sequence of states along σ
l. First, the sequence (εl)l≥1 is decreasing
and ε1 ≤ ε (property (i)). Second, for every l ≥ 1 the strategy σl is εl-optimal in the
game Γ(x1) (property (ii)). Finally, given any l ≥ 1 and any stage n ≥ 1, for every
l′ ≥ l there exists a stage n′ such that xl′n′ ≥ xln (property (iii)). This implies that
xl
′
n′ is reachable from x
l
n. Informally, a decision maker who follows the strategy σ
l can
change his mind in order to play better: at any stage he can stop following σl, choose
any l′ ≥ l, and play some actions such that the play merges eventually with the play
induced by σl
′
.
Let (εl)l≥1 be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers converging to 0 such that
ε1 = ε. For each l ≥ 1, let σl be an εl-optimal pure strategy in Γ(x1). We identify
σl with the sequence of actions (i1, i2, ...) it induces. By construction, these sequences
satisfy properties (i) and (ii). To satisfy property (iii), we extract a subsequence.
For all l ≥ 1 and all n ≥ 1, considering the strategy σl until stage n defines a vector
mn(σ
l) in M(xln). The sequence (mn(σ
l))n≥1 is non-decreasing in every coordinate, so
we can define the limit vector m∞(σl) ∈ (N × {∞})I . By definition of the limit, for
any w ∈ NI such that w ≤ m∞(σl), there exists some stage n such that w ≤ mn(σl).
Since the number of actions is finite, we can choose a subsequence of (m∞(σl))l≥1
such that each coordinate is non-decreasing in l. Informally, the closer to the value the
decision maker wants the payoff to be the more he has to play each action. We keep
the same notation, and denote by (εl)l≥1 and (σl)l≥1 the sequences after extraction.
After extraction ε1 is smaller than ε. By definition, σ
l is εl-optimal in the game
Γ(x1). Moreover, given two integers l, l
′ such that 1 ≤ l ≤ l′, we have m∞(σl) ≤
m∞(σl
′
). Let n be a positive integer, then
mn(σ
l) ≤ m∞(σl) ≤ m∞(σl′).
By definition of m∞(σl
′
) as a limit, there exists a stage n′ such that mn′(σl
′
) is greater
than mn(σ
l), and thus xl
′
n′ is greater than x
l
n. The subsequences (εl)l≥1 and (σl)l≥1
satisfy all the properties (i)− (iii).
We now deduce that the value along σ1 is non decreasing: for every n ≥ 1, the
uniform value in state x1n is equal to the uniform value in the initial state. Fix n ≥ 1
and l′ ≥ 1. By construction, there exists n′ ≥ n such that xl′n′ can be reached from state
x1n. Applying Lehrer and Sorin [LS92], we know that the value is non increasing along
plays so v∗(x1n) ≥ v∗(xl′n′). Moreover, the strategy σl′ defines a continuation strategy
from xl
′
n′ , which yields an average long-run payoff of at least v
∗(x1) − εl′ . Thus, the
uniform value along the play induced by σl′ does not drop below v
∗(x1)− εl′ :
v∗(xl
′
n′) ≥ v∗(x1)− εl′ .
Considering both results together, we obtain that
v∗(x1n) ≥ v∗(xl
′
n′) ≥ v∗(x1)− εl′ .
Since it is true for every l′ ≥ 1, we deduce that the value is non decreasing along σ1.
In order to conclude, notice that ε1 ≤ ε, therefore σ1 is ε-optimal. 
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.1(1)
In this subsection, we prove Theorem 3.1(1): in every commutative MDP with a
uniform value in pure strategies, there exists a 0-optimal strategy.
A strategy σ is said to be partially 0-optimal if the limsup of the sequence of
expected average payoffs is equal to the uniform value: lim supn γn(x1, σ) = v
∗(x1).
We first deduce from Lemma 4.2 the existence of partially 0-optimal pure strategies.
As shown in Example 4.1, expected average payoffs may not converge along partially
0-optimal strategy and, in particular, can be small infinitely often. The key point of
the proof of Theorem 3.1(1) is that different partially 0-optimal strategies have bad
expected average payoff at different stages. By choosing a proper mixed strategy that
is supported by pure partially 0-optimal strategies, we can ensure that, at each stage,
the probability to play one pure strategy with a bad expected average payoff is small.
We will first provide the formal definition of partially 0-optimal strategies and the
concatenation of a sequence of strategies along a sequence of stopping times. Then,
we define two specific sequences such that the concatenated strategy σ∗ is 0-optimal.
The proof of the optimality of σ∗ is done in two steps: we check that the support of
σ∗ is included in the set of partially 0-optimal strategies, and that the probability to
play a strategy with a bad expected average payoff at stage n converges to 0 for n
sufficiently large.
We now start the proof of Theorem 3.1(1) by defining formally a partially 0-optimal
strategy.
Definition 4.3 Let Γ = (X, I, q, g) be an MDP and v∗(x1) be the uniform value of
the MDP starting at x1. A strategy σ is partially 0-optimal if
lim sup
n
γn(x1, σ) = v
∗(x1).
That is, for every ε > 0, the long run expected average payoff is greater than v∗(x1)−ε
infinitely often.
We define the concatenation of strategies with respect to a sequence of stopping
times 2. Let (ul)l≥2 be a sequence of increasing stopping times and (σl)l≥1 be a sequence
of strategies. The concatenated strategy σ∗ is defined as follows. For every t ≥ 1 and
every ht = (x1, i1, j1, ..., xt), let l
∗ = l∗(ht) = sup{l, ul(ht) ≤ t} and σ∗(ht) = σl∗(hu
∗
l
t )
where h
u∗l
t = (xu∗l , iu∗l , ju∗l ..., xt). Informally, for every l ≥ 2, at stage ul the decision
maker forgets the past history and follows σl.
Definition of the 0-optimal strategy: Fix x1 ∈ X. For every t ≥ 1, we denote by
X(t) the set of states which can be reached from x1 in less than t stages. Since the
transition is deterministic and the number of actions is finite, the set X(t) is finite for
every t ≥ 1. We choose two specific sequences of stopping times and strategies and
2A stopping time u is a random variable such that the event {u ≤ n} is measurable with respect
to the history up to stage n
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denote by σ∗ the concatenation. Let (εl)l≥1 be a decreasing sequence of real numbers
converging to 0. For each x ∈ X and every integer l ≥ 1, we denote by σl(x) an
εl-optimal strategy in Γ(x) such that the uniform value is constant on the play, and
let N(l, x) be an integer that satisfies
∀n ≥ N(l, x), γn(x, σl(x)) ≥ v∗(x)− εl. (1)
In any games longer than N(l, x) stages, the average expected payoff is close to the
value, but the payoff in shorter games is not controlled. The strategy σl(x) exists by
Lemma 4.2.
We now define the sequence of stopping times. For every l ≥ 1, we define a set of
stages Tl and let ul be a stopping time uniformly distributed over Tl. Start by setting
t1 = 1 and T1 = {1}. Let l ≥ 1 and assume that the set Tl is already defined. Denote
tl+1 =
[
1
εl+1
]
+ 1 and define the set Tl+1 = {T (1)l+1, ..., T (tl+1)l+1 } by induction:
T
(1)
l+1 = T
(tl)
l + max
x∈X(T (tl)l )
N(l, x) +
[
1
εl
+ 1
]
T
(tl)
l ,
T
(2)
l+1 = T
(1)
l+1 + max
x∈X(T (1)l+1)
N(l + 1, x),
..., ...
T
(tl+1)
l+1 = T
(tl+1−1)
l+1 + max
x∈X(T (tl+1−1)l+1 )
N (l + 1, x) .
Let t ∈ Tl+1, we call the smallest integer strictly greater than t in Tl+1 ∪ Tl+2, the
successor of t. Formally, there exists cl+1 ≤ tl+1 such that t = T (cl+1)l+1 . If cl+1 is strictly
smaller than tl+1, the successor of t is T
(cl+1+1)
l+1 ; if cl+1 = tl+1, then the successor of t
is T
(1)
l+2.
We make few comments on the definition of the set Tl+1. First, the number of
stages between two different integers t and t′ in Tl+1 is such that a strategy, which
starts playing like σl+1(xt) at stage t yields an expected average payoff between stage
t and stage t′− 1 greater than v∗(x1)− εl+1. Second, the weight of the first T tll stages
in a game of length T 1l+1 is small.
We prove that the strategy σ∗(x1) is 0-optimal. We consider here σ∗(x1) as a mixed
strategy, i.e. a probability over pure strategies. More precisely, let Ω be the set of
pure strategies defined as concatenation of a sequence of integers (nl)l≥2 with nl ∈ Tl
for every l ≥ 2 and the sequence of strategy (σl)l≥1. σ∗ is a probability over Ω.
We show that every pure strategy in Ω is partially 0-optimal.
Lemma 4.4 Let (nl)l≥2 be a sequence of integers such that for every l ≥ 2, nl ∈ Tl.
Denote by σ the concatenated strategy induced by (nl)l≥2 and (σl)l≥1.
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The strategy σ is partially 0-optimal. Moreover, we have explicit lower bounds for
specific stages. For every l ≥ 2, let n′l be the successor of nl. Then
∀l ≥ 2, ∀n ∈ [n′l − 1, nl+1 − 1], γn(x1, σ) ≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−1.
Proof: We first show that the sequence γnl+1−1(x1, σ) converges to the uniform value
v∗(x1) when l goes to ∞. At stage nl, the strategy σ starts to follow an εl-optimal
strategy from the current state. By definition, n′l−nl ≥ N(l, xnl), and thus by Equation
(1)
γnl,n′l−1(x1, σ) = γn′l−nl(xnl , σl(xnl)) ≥ v∗(xnl)− εl ≥ v∗(x1)− εl.
More generally, for every n ∈ [n′l − 1, nl+1 − 1], we have
γnl,n(x1, σ) = γn−nl+1(xnl , σl(xnl)) ≥ v∗(x1)− εl.
In particular we have
γnl,nl+1−1(x1, σ) ≥ v∗(x1)− εl. (2)
The expected average payoff between stage nl and nl+1−1 is greater than v∗(x1)−εl.
It follows that the sequence (γnl+1−1(x1, σ))l≥1 converges to v
∗(x1) and therefore the
strategy σ is partially 0-optimal.
We now prove the second part of the lemma, giving some explicit subsequences
and bounds on the rate of convergence: for all l ≥ 2, for all n between n′l − 1 and
nl+1 − 1, we prove that
γn(x1, σ) ≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−1. (3)
Fix l ≥ 2. We first prove this lower bound for the expected average payoff until
stage nl − 1 (which is before n′l − 1). By definition of T 1l , the weight of the nl−1 first
stages is small in the MDP of length nl − 1:
nl−1 − 1
nl − 1 ≤
nl−1 − 1
T
(1)
l − 1
≤ T
(tl−1)
l−1
T
(tl−1)
l−1 +N(l − 1, xT (tl−1)l−1 )− 1 +
[
1
εl−1
+ 1
]
T
(tl−1)
l−1
≤ T
(tl−1)
l−1[
1
εl−1
+ 1
]
T
(tl−1)
l−1
≤ εl−1.
Using Equation (2) for l′ = l − 1 and the previous equation, it follows that
γnl−1(x1, σ) =
[
nl−1 − 1
nl − 1 γnl−1−1(x1, σ) +
nl − nl−1
nl − 1 γnl−1,nl−1(x1, σ)
]
,
≥
[
γnl−1,nl−1(x1, σ)−
nl−1 − 1
nl − 1
]
,
≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−1.
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Let n be a positive integer between n′l − 1 and nl+1 − 1. The expected average
payoff until stage n is the convex combination of the expected average payoff until
stage nl − 1 (before n′l − 1) and the average expected payoff between stages nl and
n. Both of these quantities are greater than v∗(x1)− 2εl−1, and therefore their convex
combination is greater than v∗(x1)− 2εl−1 as well. 
Remark 4.5 Following the notation of Lemma 4.4, if n ∈ ∪l≥2[nl, n′l − 2] then we
only know that the n-stage expected average payoff is greater than 0.
Lemma 4.6 σ∗(x1) is a 0-optimal strategy.
Proof: We consider here σ∗(x1) as a mixed strategy. Lemma 4.4 showed that with
probability one the pure strategies in the support of σ∗ are partially 0-optimal.
Let l ≥ 2 and fix n an integer in [T 1l , T 1l+1 − 1]. We show that, with probability
higher than 1− εl, the decision maker is following a pure strategy giving an expected
average payoff until stage n higher than v∗(x1)− 2εl−2.
By definition, there exists a unique stage n∗l in Tl such that n is between n
∗
l and
n′∗l − 1 where n′∗l is the successor of n∗l :
n∗l ≤ n ≤ n′∗l − 1. (4)
Let σ be a pure strategy with positive probability under σ∗. There exists a sequence
(nd)d≥2 such that for all d ≥ 2, nd ∈ Td and σ is the concatenated strategy induced by
(nd)d≥2 and (σd)d≥1. We follow the previous notation and denote for every d ≥ 2, the
successor of nd by n
′
d. Since n ∈ [T 1l , T 1l+1− 1], by construction of the sets Tl−1,Tl, and
Tl+1, we have
n′l−1 ≤ n ≤ nl+1 − 1. (5)
We now use the inequalities (4) and (5) to handle the three different cases depend-
ing on the respective places of n∗l , the beginning of the block containing n, and nl, the
stage where the strategy σ is switching from an εl−1 strategy to an εl-optimal strategy:
nl > n
∗
l , nl < n
∗
l , and nl = n
∗
l .
If nl > n
∗
l , then at stage n the pure strategy σ is still following the εl−1-optimal
strategy from state xnl−1 and therefore yields a high expected average payoff. Formally,
we have n′l−1 ≤ n ≤ n′∗l − 1 ≤ nl − 1, so that by Lemma 4.4 applied to l′ = l − 1,
γn(x1, σ) ≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−2.
If nl < n
∗
l , then at stage n, the pure strategy σ has already followed the εl-optimal
strategy from state xnl for a long time and thus yields a high expected average payoff.
Formally, we have n′l ≤ n∗l ≤ n ≤ nl+1 − 1, so that by Lemma 4.4 applied to l,
γn(x1, σ) ≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−1 ≥ v∗(x1)− 2εl−2.
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Finally if nl = n
∗
l , we do not control the expected average payoff but by definition
of the stopping time ul the probability of the event {nl = n∗l } is smaller than εl under
σ∗.
We can now conclude. We denote by Pσ∗ the probability distribution induced by σ
∗
on the set of pure strategy and Eσ∗ the corresponding expectation. Since the payoffs
are in [0, 1], it follows that
γn(x1, σ
∗) = Eσ∗ (γn(x1, σ)) ≥ (1− εl)(v∗(x1)− 2εl−2) ≥ v∗(x1)− 3εl−2.
This is true for every l ≥ 1 and every integer n ∈ [T 1l , T 1l+1− 1], therefore the expected
average payoff converges to the uniform value: the strategy σ∗ is 0-optimal. 
4.4 Proof of Theorem 3.1(2)
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.1(2): namely, if the set of states X is a precompact
metric space, the transition is 1-Lipschitz, deterministic, and commutative, and the
payoff function is uniformly continuous, then there exists a pure 0-optimal strategy.
We will first justify the existence of the uniform value and that we can assume that
the set of states is compact. Then, we will define recursively a sequence of states (xl)l≥1
such that x1 = x1 and x
l+1 is a limit point of states along an εl-optimal pure strategy
σl(xl) starting from xl where the value is constant on the induced play. Therefore, the
value in all these states is equal to v∗(x1).
For each l ≥ 1 we will define by induction a sequence of stages (nlk)k≥1 such that
the sequence of states induced by σl at stages nlk converges to the limit point x
l+1. We
impose in addition conditions on nll+1 and on the speed of convergence. This sequence
of stages splits the strategy σl into a finite sequence of streaks of actions. Given k ≥ 1,
we call an elementary block the streak of actions played between stage nlk−1 and n
l
k.
Note that it has nlk−nlk−1 actions. By convention, the first block starts at stage nl0 = 1.
We will define the 0-optimal strategy σ∗ by playing these elementary blocks in a
specific order. The strategy σ∗ is defined as a succession of two types of blocks (Al)l≥1
and (Bl)l≥1 such that for all l ≥ 1, Al is composed of l + 1 consecutive elementary
blocks from σl(xl) and Bl is composed of l−1 elementary blocks, one from each σl′(xl′)
for 1 ≤ l′ ≤ l − 1:
σ∗ = (A1, B1, A2, B2, A3, ....).3
Block Bl−1 ensures that the distance between the state at the beginning of block
Al and x
l is small. Block Al guarantees an expected average payoff close to the value
up to a function of εl. Moreover, block Al is long enough for the total expected av-
erage payoff of σ∗ at the end of Al to be close to the value. It will follow that the
strategy σ∗ is partially 0-optimal. The rest of the proof consists in showing that the
expected average payoff does not drop between these stages, neither during block Bl+1
nor during the first stages of Al+1. It follows that the strategy is 0-optimal.
3Recall that a pure strategy is identified with the sequence of actions it selects on the play path.
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Let Γ = (X, I, J, q, g) be a deterministic commutative MDP with a precompact
metric space, a uniformly continuous payoff function and a 1-Lipschitz transition. We
first justify the existence of the uniform value. We follow Section 6.1 in Renault
[Ren11]. Let Ψ = (Z, F, r) be an auxilliary dynamic programming problem. The set
of states is Z = X × I, the correspondence is given by
∀(x, i) ∈ Z, F (x, i) = {(q(x, a), a), a ∈ I},
and the payoff function is for all (x, i) ∈ Z, r(x, i) = g(x, i). We consider on Z the
following metric D((x, i), (x′, i′) = max(d(x, x′), δi 6=i′). The set of states (Z,D) is pre-
compact metric, the correspondence is 1-Lipschtiz (i.e. for all z, z′ ∈ Z, z1 ∈ F (z)
there exists z′1 ∈ F (z) such that D(z1, z′1) ≤ D(z, z′) ) and the payoff function is
equicontinuous. By Corollary 3.9 of the same paper [Ren11], Ψ has a uniform value
for any initial state. We can deduce immediatly that Γ(x1) has a uniform value for
every x1 ∈ X.
We now prove that we can assume that X is compact. Define an MDP Γˆ(Xˆ, I, qˆ, gˆ)
as follows: Xˆ is the Cauchy completion of X, qˆ is the 1-Lipschitz extension of q to Xˆ,
gˆ is the uniformly continuous extension4 of g to Xˆ. By Renault [Ren11] and previous
paragraph, both MDPs Γ and Γˆ have a uniform value for any initial state.
Moreover the previous construction defines the transition on new states but does
not change its value whenever it was already defined: for any state x1 in X, qˆ and q
coincides, as well as g and gˆ. Therefore the MDPs Γ(x1) and Γˆ(x1) are the same MDP
on X. It follows that they have the same value.
In the following we assume that X is compact. Let x1 ∈ X and let (εl)l≥1 be a
decreasing sequence of positive real numbers that converges to 0. For each x ∈ X and
l ≥ 1 denote by σl(x) an εl-optimal pure strategy in Γ(x) such that the value along
the induced play is constant, and by N(l, x) an integer such that
∀n ≥ N(l, x), γn(x, σl(x)) ≥ v∗(x)− εl.
Since g is uniformly continuous, there exists (ηl)l≥1 such that
∀x, x′ ∈ X, d(x, x′) ≤ ηl, ∀a ∈ ∆(I), |g(x, a)− g(x′, a)| ≤ εl.
Let σ = (it)t≥1 ∈ I∞ be an infinite sequence of actions and let x1 and x′1 be two initial
states. For every n ≥ 1, the distance between xn, the state at stage n obtained along
the play induced by x1 and σ, and x
′
n, the state at stage n obtained along the play
induced by x′1 and σ, is smaller than d(x1, x
′
1). It follows that
∀x1, x′1 ∈ X, s.t. d(x1, x′1) ≤ ηl, ∀σ = (it)t≥1 ∈ I∞, ∀n ≥ 1, |γn(x1, σ)−γn(x′1, σ)| ≤ εl.
Definition of the strategy σ∗: Let x1 = x1. Given (xj)1≤j≤l define xl+1 to be a
limit point of the play (xl, σl(x
l)). Since the value is constant on the play induced
4Note that an extension is not possible if the underlying function is only continuous.
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by (xl, σl(x
l)), the uniform value in xl+1 is also equal to v∗(x1). To construct the
0-optimal strategy, we split each play σj(x
j) into blocks by induction on j.
Let us assume that (njk)k≥1 have been defined for every j ≤ l−1, i.e. the splittings
of all strategies {σ1(x1), ..., σl−1(xl−1} have been defined. We now split the sequence
σl(x
l).
Define Ll = 1+
∑
j≤l−1(n
j
l−1), which depends only on the sequences for j ≤ (l−1).
We denote by (xln)n≥1 the sequence of states along (x
l, σl(x
l)). Let us define the se-
quence of stages (nlk)k≥1 such that it satisfies four properties. The three first properties
are restriction on nll+1 and the last one is a restriction on the rate of convergence to
xl+1. First the strategy σl(x
l) guarantees in Γ(xl) the value with an error less than εl
in all games longer than nll+1:
nll+1 ≥ N(l, xl). (6)
Second, Ll is small compared to n
l
l+1:
Ll
nll+1
≤ εl. (7)
Third,
N(l + 1, xl+1) +
∑l−1
j=1
(
njl+1 − njl
)
nll+1
≤ εl. (8)
Finally, at the beginning of the k-th block of this decomposition the state is close to
the limit point
d(xlnlk
, xl+1) ≤ ηk
k − 1 . (9)
Fix l ≥ 1. We define Al to be the finite sequence of actions given by σl(xl) between
stage 1 and stage nll+1. In term of elementary blocks, it is composed of the first l + 1
elementary blocks of σl(xl) and is composed of nll+1 − 1 actions. We define Bl as the
sequence of actions where the decision maker is playing, for each l′ < l, the elementary
block of σl
′
(xl
′
) between stages nl
′
l and n
l′
l+1. Thus Bl is the concatenation of l− 1 ele-
mentary blocks. Moreover the number of actions in Bl is bl =
∑l−1
j=1
(
njl+1 − njl
)
, which
appeared in (8). The strategy σ∗ is the sequence of actions given by the alternating
sequence (Al, Bl)l≥1.
We now show that the strategy σ∗ is 0-optimal.
We first prove that the state at the beginning of Al is close to x
l. Therefore the
expected average payoff of σ∗ at the end of Al is bigger than v∗(x1) − 3εl and σ∗ is
partially 0-optimal.
Lemma 4.7 The payoff at the end of Al is greater than v
∗(x1)− 3εl:
γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗) ≥ v∗(x1)− 3εl
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Corollary 4.8 The strategy σ∗ is partially 0-optimal.
Proof of Lemma 4.7: Let us denote by (xn)n≥1 the sequence of states on the play
induced by σ∗.
We first prove that the state at the beginning of Al is close to x
l. One can verify
that the first stage of Al is the stage Ll = 1 +
∑
j≤l−1(n
j
l − 1). By definition, at
stage Ll for each l
′ ≤ l − 1, all first l elementary blocks of σl′(xl′) have been played:
all of the first l′ + 1 on block Al′ and then one after each other in the blocks Bj for
j ∈ [l′+ 1, l− 1]. By commutativity, the state does not depend on the order of actions
and the state is the same as after the sequence σ′ where the decision maker plays
σ1(x
1) for n1l − 1 stages, σ2(x2) for n2l − 1 stages,..., and σl−1(xl−1) for nl−1l − 1 stages.
For each strategy σj, Equation (9) implies that the distance between x
j+1 and the
state at stage njl on the play from x
j is less than ηl
l−1 for each j ∈ {1, ..., l − 1}. The
map q is 1-Lipschitz, so the distances sum up and an immediate induction implies that
d(xLl , x
l) ≤ ηl. (10)
Let us now compute the payoff in the MDP of length Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1, i.e. until the
end of Al. Equation (7) ensures that the payoff is almost equal to the payoff between
stages Ll and Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1:
γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗) =
Ll − 1
Ll + nll+1 − 1
γLl−1(x1, σ
∗) +
nll+1
Ll + nll+1 − 1
γLl,Ll+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)
≥ n
l
l+1
Ll + nll+1 − 1
γLl,Ll+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)
≥ γLl,Ll+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)− Ll − 1
Ll + nll+1 − 1
≥ γLl,Ll+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)− εl.
Moreover σ∗ plays like an εl-optimal strategy in Γ(xl) between stages Ll and Ll+nll+1−
1, and the distance between xLl and x
l is less than ηl by Equation (10). Therefore, by
Equation (6) we have
γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗) ≥ γnll+1(xLl , σl(x
l))− εl
≥ γnll+1(x
l, σl(x
l))− 2εl
≥ v∗(x1)− 3εl.

We now check that the average expected payoff does not drop between these stages.
We distinguish between two different cases: if n ∈ [Ll +nll+1− 1, Ll+1 +N(l+ 1, xl+1)]
or if n ∈ [Ll+1 +N(l + 1, xl+1), Ll+1 + nl+1l+2 − 1].
In the first case, the MDP ends at a stage in Bl or in the beginning of block Al+1.
Equation (8) implies that the length of the game is almost equal to Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1,
therefore the expected average payoff is greater than v∗(x1)− 4εl.
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In the second case, the MDP ends in the middle of block Al+1. The expected
average payoff is the convex combination of the expected average payoff until Ll+1− 1
and the average expected payoff between Ll+1 and n. We check that both of them are
high and we deduce that the expected average payoff is greater than v∗(x1)− 4εl.
Lemma 4.9 Let n ∈ [Ll + nll+1 − 1, Ll+1 +N(l + 1, xl+1)]. Then
γn(x1, σ
∗) ≥ v∗(x1)− 4εl.
The expected average payoff in any n-stage MDP such that n is in the middle of block
Bl or at the beginning of block Al+1 is greater than v
∗(x1)− 4εl.
Proof: The key point is that the number of stages is close to the case of Lemma 4.7.
Let n ∈ [Ll + nll+1 − 1, Ll+1 +N(l + 1, xl+1)]. By equation (8), we have
n− Ll − nll+1 + 1 ≤ N(l + 1, xl+1) +
l−1∑
j=1
(njl+1 − njl )
≤ εlnll+1.
It follows that
γn(x1, σ
∗) =
Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1
n
γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗) +
n− Ll − nll+1 + 1
n
γLl+nll+1,n(x1, σ
∗)
≥ Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1
n
γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)
≥ γLl+nll+1−1(x1, σ
∗)− n− Ll − n
l
l+1 + 1
n
≥ v∗(x1)− 3εl −
n− Ll − nll+1 + 1
nll+1
≥ v∗(x1)− 4εl.
Lemma 4.10 Let n ∈ [Ll+1 +N(l + 1, xl+1), Ll+1 + nl+1l+2 − 1]. Then
γn(x1, σ
∗) ≥ v∗(x1)− 4εl.
The payoff in any n-stage MDP stopping in the middle of block Al+1 is greater than
v∗(x1)− 4εl.
Proof: Let n ∈ [Ll+1 + N(l + 1, xl+1), Ll+1 + nl+1l+2 − 1]. The expected average payoff
is the convex combination of the expected average payoff until Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1 and the
expected average payoff between Ll + n
l
l+1 − 1 and n. It follows that
γn(x1, σ
∗) =
Ll+1 − 1
n
γLl+1−1(x1, σ
∗) +
n− (Ll+1 − 1)
n
γLl+1,n(x1, σ
∗)
=
Ll+1 − 1
n
γLl+1−1(x1, σ
∗) +
n− (Ll+1 − 1)
n
γn−Ll+1+1(xLl+1 , σl+1(xLl+1))
≥ Ll+1 − 1
n
(v∗(x1)− 4εl) + n− (Ll+1 − 1)
n
(v∗(xl+1)− 2εl+1)
≥ v∗(x1)− 4εl.
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The expected average payoff is greater than v∗(x1)− 4εl. 
Lemma 4.9 and Lemma 4.10 are true for every l ≥ 1, therefore the strategy σ∗ is
pure and 0-optimal at x1, which concludes the proof.
5 Commutative stochastic games.
In this section, we focus on commutative stochastic games and state-blind repeated
games. In Section 5.1, we show that the class of absorbing games is in fact a subclass of
commutative stochastic games. We show that each absorbing state can be replaced by a
non-absorbing state leading to some new states, which are useless from a strategic point
of view but designed in order to fulfill the commutativity assumption. In Section 5.2,
we prove the existence of the uniform value in stochastic games with a deterministic
commutative 1-Lipschitz transition (Theorem 3.6). In Section 5.3, we deduce the
existence of the uniform value in state blind commutative repeated games (Corollary
3.7). In Section 5.4, we provide some generalizations.
5.1 Absorbing games
Absorbing games were introduced by Kohlberg [Koh74]. They are stochastic games
with a single non-absorbing state. An absorbing game is thus given by Γ = ({α} ∪
X, I, J, q, g) where α is the unique non-absorbing state and all states x ∈ X are
absorbing: q(x, i, j)(x) = 1 ∀x ∈ X, i ∈ I, j ∈ J. The state α is the only state where
the players have an influence on the payoff and on future states. For each action pair
(i, j) ∈ I × J , we denote by q(α, i, j)(X) the total probability to reach an absorbing
state by playing the action pair (i, j).
Proposition 5.1 Let Γ = ({α} ∪ X, I, J, q, g) be an absorbing game. There exists a
commutative game Γ′ = (X ′, I, J, q′, g′) and a state α′2 ∈ X ′ such that for all n ≥ 1,
vn(α) = v
′
n(α
′
2). Moreover a player can guarantee w in Γ
′(α′2) if and only if he can
guarantee w in Γ(α).
Proof: Let q(α, i, j|X) be the conditional probability on X if the action pair (i, j)
is played and there has been absorption. Define an auxiliary commmutative game
Γ′ = (X ′, I ′, J ′, q′, g′) as follows. The action spaces are I ′ = I and J ′ = J . For each
i ∈ I (resp. j ∈ J), we define a new state xi (resp. xj). The state space is given by
X ′ = XI×XJ , where XI = {α′}∪{xi, i ∈ I}∪{ω} and XJ = {α′}∪{xj, j ∈ J}∪{ω}.
In the following, we denote (α′, α′) by α′2. The payoff function is defined by
∀i, i′ ∈ I,∀j, j′ ∈ J, g′(α′2, i, j)= g(α, i, j),
g′((xi′ , xj′), i, j)= Eq(α,i′,j′|X)(g(x)),
g′((xi′ , ω), i, j)= 1,
g′((ω, xj′), i, j)= 0,
g′((ω, ω), i, j)= 1/2.
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The payoff function in Γ′ reflects the role of the different states. The state α′2 is
a substitute of the state α, and for each pair (i′, j′), the state (xi′ , xj′) replaces the
absorption occurring in state α by playing the action pair (i′, j′). This state will not
be absorbing but an equilibrium at (xi′ , xj′) is to stay in this state. If player 1 devi-
ates, then with some probability the state will remain (xi′ , xj′) and with the remaining
probability the new state will be (ω, xj′), where player 2 can guarantee a payoff of
0. Similarly, if player 2 deviates, then the new state will remain (xi′ , xj′) with some
probability and with the remaining probability it will be (xi′ , ω) where player 1 can
guarantee a payoff of 1.
The transition q′ is defined in three steps: we define two transitions sI on XI
controlled only by player 1 and sJ on XJ controlled only by player 2. We then consider
the product transition corresponding to the absorbing part of q, and finally we define
q′. At each step, we check that the transition is commutative. We define sI and sJ by
∀i, i′ ∈ I, sI(α′, i) = xi, ∀j, j′ ∈ J, sJ(α′, j) = xj,
sI(xi′ , i) =
{
xi′ if i = i
′,
ω if i 6= i′, sJ(xj′ , j) =
{
xj′ if j = j
′,
ω if j 6= j′,
sI(ω, i) =ω, sJ(ω, j) =ω.
We now verify that sI is commutative. A similar argument shows that sJ is com-
mutative. Let i and i′ be two actions of player 1. It is sufficient to check that sI
commutes when i 6= i′. However, if player 1 plays i and i′, the state after two stages
is ω regardless of the initial state and of the order in which he plays these actions.
Let s be the transition on XI ×XJ defined by s((x, y), (i, j)) = (sI(x, i), sJ(y, j)).
The reader can verify that s is commutative; it is depicted graphically in Figure 2.
Let q′ be defined as follows: q′(x, i, j) = q(α, i, j)(α)δx + q(α, i, j)(X)δs(x,i,j) for all
x ∈ X ′, for all i ∈ I, and for all j ∈ J . Thus for all x ∈ X, for all i, i′ ∈ I and for all
j, j′ ∈ J we have
q˜′(q′(x, i, j), i′, j′) = q(α, i, j)(α)q(α, i′, j′)(α)δx + q(α, i, j)(α)q(α, i′, j′)(X)δs(x,i′,j′)
+ q(α, i, j)(X)q(α, i′, j′)(α)δs(x,i,j) + q(α, i, j)(X)q(α, i′, j′)(X)δs(s(x,i,j),i′,j′).
(11)
The right hand side of Equation (11) is symmetric between (i, j) and (i′, j′) except the
last term that involves s. Since s is commutative, so is q′. Note that q˜ may not be the
product of one function depending on I and one function depending on J .
Fix n ≥ 1. We prove that the n-stage values of Γ(α) and the n-stage values of
Γ′(α′2) are equal. Since the state (ω, ω) is absorbing, the value is equal to 1/2, the
stage payoff. For all i′ in I, the state (xi′ , ω) is controlled by player 1. His optimal
action is i′ which guarantees him a payoff of 1. The situation is symmetric for (ω, xj′),
so for all j′ ∈ J , v′n((ω, xj′)) = 0. Fix (i′, j′) ∈ I ×J . The action i′(resp. j′) is optimal
for player 1 (resp. 2) in state (xi′ , xj′) thus v
′
n(xi′,j′) = Eq(α,i′,j′|X)(g(x)). The stage
payoffs and the continuation values are equal in both the game Γ(α) and the game
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j↓
j
↓
i→
 (ω, ω) (ω, xj) (ω, ω)(xi, ω)  (xi, ω)
(ω, ω) (ω, xj) (ω, ω)
  (ω, ω) (ω, ω) (ω, ω)  
(ω, ω) (ω, ω) (ω, ω)

(xi, xj) (xi, ω)
i→
 (ω, ω)  (ω, ω)(ω, ω)  (ω, ω)
(ω, ω)  (ω, ω)
      
  

(ω, xj) (ω, ω)
Figure 2: A graphic depiction of s.
Γ′(α2) so the values in α and in α′2 are equal.
Finally there is a correspondence between strategies. Given a strategy σ for player
1 in the absorbing game Γ that guarantees w, define σ′ in Γ′ by σ′(α′2) = σ(α) and for
all i′ ∈ I, σ′(xi′ , .) = i′. For all i′ ∈ I and j′ ∈ J , this strategy guarantees the payoff
Eq(α,i′,j′|X)(g(x)) in the state (xi′ , xj′), so it guarantees w from state α′2. Reciprocally
given σ′ a strategy in Γ′ that guarantees w′ from α′2, then σ
′∗ the strategy in Γ′ such
that σ′∗(α′2) = σ
′(α′2) and σ
′∗(xi, .) = i also guarantees w′ in Γ′(α′2). The strategy σ
defined by σ(α) = σ′(α′2) guarantees the same payoff in the absorbing game. From a
strategic point of view the two games are completely equivalent. 
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3.6
In this section we prove Theorem 3.6. Let Γ = (X, I, J, q, g) be a stochastic game
where X is a compact subset of Rm, I and J are finite sets, q is commutative, de-
terministic, and 1-Lipschitz for ‖.‖1, and g is continuous. We will prove that for all
z1 ∈ ∆f (X), the stochastic game Γ(z1) has a uniform value. It is sufficient to prove
that for all x1 ∈ X, Γ(x1) has a uniform value.
The outline of the proof is the following. For each x ∈ X we separate the action
pairs into two different sets. An action pair (i, j) ∈ I×J is cyclic at x if the play that
is obtained by repeating (i, j) starting from x, comes back to x after a finite number
of stages. If (i, j) does not satisfy this property, we say that it is non-cyclic. Denote
by C(x) the set of cyclic action pairs at x and by NC(x) = (I × J)\C(x) the set of
non-cyclic action pairs at x.
We denote by Φk = {x; |C(x)| ≥ k} the set of states with more than k cyclic action
pairs. We will prove by induction on the number of cyclic action pairs that the uniform
value exists for all initial points x1 ∈ X.
We first argue that Φ|I×J | is non-empty and every state x1 ∈ Φ|I×J | has a uniform
value. To this end we will note that whatever the players play, only finitely many
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states can be reached from x1, so that Γ(x1) is in essence a game with a finite number
of states. By Mertens and Neyman [MN81] the game has a uniform value.
For the induction step, given a state x1 with k − 1 cyclic action pairs, we study
a family (Γ˙(ε, x1))ε>0 of games, which approximate Γ(x1) more and more precisely,
and that have a uniform value. Assume by induction that for all states x in Φl, for
l ≥ k, the game Γ(x) has a uniform value. For each ε > 0, let η be defined by uniform
continuity of g. The game Γ˙(ε, x1) is defined as follows: every state x such that there
exists l ≥ k and x′ ∈ Φl with ‖x − x′‖1 ≤ η is turned into an absorbing state with
payoff the uniform value at x′. We will show that Γ˙(ε, x1) can be written with a finite
number of states, depending on x1. By Mertens and Neyman [MN81], it has a uniform
value at the initial state x1 denoted v(ε)(x1). Finally, we prove that v(ε)(x1) converges
when ε goes to 0 and that the limit is the uniform value of Γ(x1).
We now turn to the formal proof. We first prove an auxiliary Lemma studying the
play induced by iterating the same action pair in Section 5.2.1. In Section 5.2.2, we
focus on the initial step of the induction. In Section 5.2.3, we prove the inductive step
and conclude the proof.
Denote by qi,j the operator from X to X defined by qi,j(x) = q(x, i, j). The map q
is deterministic, so we can define the play along a sequence of actions. Fix n ≥ 1 and
h = (i1, j1, ..., in, jn) ∈ (I × J)n. For all integers l ≤ n set xl+1(h) = qil,jl ...qi1,j1x1 =∏l
t=1 qit,jtx1. We say that x is reachable from x1 if there exists a play from x1 to x.
5.2.1 Asymptotic behavior of the play induced by one action pair
Let x ∈ X. If the action pair (i, j) is cyclic at x then the sequence of states induced
by repeating (i, j) from x is periodic. We focus on a non-cyclic action pair at x and we
will prove that the set of states along the play induced by repeating (i, j) converges
to a periodic orbit of states with strictly more cyclic action pairs than x. In order to
prove this result, we use the following lemma (Sine [Sin90]).
Lemma 5.2 Let m ≥ 1, there exists f(m) ≥ 1 such that for all maps M from X ⊂ Rm
to X, 1-Lipschtiz for ‖.‖1, there exists an integer L ≤ f(m) and a family of maps
B0,· · · , BL−1 such that
∀l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}, lim
t→+∞
M tL+l = Bl.
A classic example is the case where M is the transition of a Markov chain on a finite
set. If λ is a complex eigenvalue of M then |λ| ≤ 1 since the map is 1-Lipschitz.
Moreover the theorem of Perron-Frobenius ensures that if |λ| = 1 then there exists
l ≤ m such that λl = 1. The integer L is then the smallest common multiple of all
such l and we can take f(m) = m!.
Applied to our framework, we deduce that, by iterating a non cyclic action pair
(i, j) from x, the induced play has a finite number of limit points with strictly more
cyclic action pairs than x.
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Lemma 5.3 Let x ∈ X, (i, j) ∈ NC(x) be a non-cyclic action pair at x, and ε > 0.
There exist an integer n and a finite set Sx ⊂ X such that
∀t ≥ n,∃x′ ∈ Sx, ‖qti,jx− x′‖1 ≤ ε and ]C(x′) ≥ ]C(x) + 1.
Proof: Let x ∈ X, (i, j) ∈ NC(x) be a non cyclic action pair and ε be a positive real.
We show three properties: first the sequence (qti,jx)t≥1 has a finite number of limit
points, then a cyclic action pair at x is still cyclic at the limit points and finally the
pair (i, j) becomes cyclic at the limit points. Therefore, the number of cyclic action
pairs strictly increases.
By Lemma 5.2 applied to Q = qi,j, there exist an integer L and some operators
B0,..., BL−1 such that
∀l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1} lim
t→+∞
QtL+l = Bl.
In addition, for every l ∈ {0, ..., L − 1}, QlB0 = B0Ql = Bl. By compactness of X,
B0x is in X and there exists an integer n such that
∀t ≥ n, ‖QtLx−B0x‖1 ≤ ε.
Since Q is 1-Lipschitz for the norm 1, ‖QtL+lx − Blx‖1 ≤ ε. Denoting n′ = n(L + 1)
and Sx = {Blx, l = 0, . . . , L− 1}, we have
∀t ≥ n′, ∃x′ ∈ Sx, ‖Qtx− x′‖1 ≤ ε.
The play has a finite number of limit points.
Let (i′, j′) be a cyclic action pair in x and d an integer such that qdi′,j′x = x. We
check that (i′, j′) is still cyclic at the limit points. For all l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}, we have
qdi′,j′Blx = lim
t
qdi′,j′Q
tL+lx
= lim
t
QtL+lqdi′,j′x = lim
t
QtL+lx = Blx.
The commutation assumption implies the second equality. Therefore (i′, j′) is still a
cyclic action pair on the set Sx.
Moreover the iterated action pair (i, j), which was non-cyclic at x, becomes cyclic
at x′ for all x′ ∈ Sx. For all l ∈ {0, ..., L− 1}, we have
QLBlx = lim
t
QLQtL+lx = lim
t
Q(t+1)L+lx = Blx.
All cyclic action pairs at x are still cyclic on Sx and (i, j) becomes cyclic, so the number
of cycling action pairs is strictly increasing. 
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Example 5.4 Consider a stochastic game with state space X = ∆(Z/2Z), initial
state x1 = (1, 0), trivial sets of actions I = {i1}, J = {j1}, and transition
Q = qi1,j1 =
(
1/4 3/4
3/4 1/4
)
.
Then for all t ∈ N, Qtx1 has no cyclic action pairs but it converges to x∞ = (1/2, 1/2)
where the action pair (i1, j1) is cyclic.
5.2.2 Initialization of the induction
Proposition 5.5 The set Φ|I×J | is non-empty.
The proposition is an immediate corrolary of Lemma 5.3. Starting from any initial
state x1 ∈ X, we apply Lemma 5.3 to one non-cyclic action pair and we get a state
x2 ∈ X with more cyclic action pairs. Then, we can repeat from this new state and
iterate the lemma until all the action pairs are cyclic.
Proposition 5.6 ∀x1 ∈ Φ|I×J |, the game Γ(x1) has a uniform value.
Proof: Fix x1 ∈ Φ|I×J |. Let M ≥ 1 be such that for all action pairs (i, j), the play
that starts at x1 and in which the players repeatedly play (i, j) returns to x after at
most M stages. We argue by contradiction that all states reachable from x1 can be
reached in less than (M − 1)](I × J) stages. By contradiction let x∗ be a state, which
is not reached in (M − 1)](I × J) stages. We define
t∗ = inf
t≥1
{
t, ∃h = (il, jl)l=1...t ∈ (I × J)t, xt(h) = x∗
}
the minimum number of stages needed to reach x∗. By assumption, t∗ > (M−1)](I×J)
and ∑
(i,j)∈C(x1)
]{l, (il, jl) = (i, j)} = t∗
⇒ ∃(i∗, j∗) ∈ C(x1) ]{l, (il, jl) = (i∗, j∗)} ≥ t
∗
](I × J)
⇒ ∃(i∗, j∗) ∈ C(x1) ]{l, (il, jl) = (i∗, j∗)} ≥M.
So one action pair is repeated more than M times. By definition, there exists d∗ ≤
M such that qd
∗
i,jx1 = x1. Hence the state at stage t
∗−d∗ along the sequence of actions
deduced from h, by deleting d∗ times the action pairs (i∗, j∗), is x∗. This contradicts
the definition of t∗. Therefore, all states are reached in less than (M − 1)](I × J)
stages and since I and J are finite, the game Γ(x1) can be defined only with a finite
number of states.
Formally, the game Γ(x1) is a stochastic game with a finite set of states and finite
sets of actions, so it has a uniform value by the theorem of Mertens and Neyman
[MN81]. 
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5.2.3 Inductive step
We now prove the inductive step. Fix 0 < k ≤ |I × J | and assume that for all
x ∈ ∪|I×J |l=k Φl, the game Γ(x) has a uniform value. Fix x1 ∈ Φk−1.
First, we check that the 1-Lipschitz transition and the uniform continuity of the
payoff imply the continuity of the payoff that a player can guarantee, then we describe
the family of auxiliary games and conclude the proof.
Lemma 5.7 Given ε > 0, there exists η > 0 such that if x ∈ X and player 1 guar-
antees w in Γ(x) then, for all x′, such that ‖x − x′‖1 ≤ η, he guarantees w − ε in
Γ(x′).
Proof: Given ε > 0, for all (i, j) ∈ I × J , the map g(·, i, j) is uniformly continuous.
Moreover, the number of maps is finite, so there exists η > 0 such that for all x, x′ ∈ X
with ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ η, we have
∀(i, j) ∈ (I × J), |g(x, i, j)− g(x′, i, j)| ≤ ε.
We first check the result for pure strategies. Fix x ∈ X. Let σ ∈ Σ be a pure
strategy, we define σ˜(x) to be the strategy which plays as if the game were Γ(x) no
matter what the initial state is. In particular, this strategy does not depend on the
state and only on the sequence of actions. Let τ ∈ JN be a sequence of actions of
player 2.
We denote by xt the state at stage t along (x, σ, τ) and x
′
t the state at stage t
along (x′, σ˜(x), τ). For all (i, j) ∈ I × J , q is a 1-Lipschtiz function so for all t ≥ 1,
‖xt − x′t‖1 ≤ ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ η, and for all n ≥ 1,
|γn(x, σ, τ)− γn(x′, σ˜(x), τ)| ≤ 1
n
n∑
t=1
|g(xt, it, jt)− g(x′t, it, jt)|
≤ ε.
Let σ∗ be a mixed strategy5. We denote by Pσ∗ the probability distribution induced
by σ∗ on the set of pure strategies and Eσ∗ the corresponding expectation. We define
the mixed strategy σ˜∗ by associating to each pure strategy σ the strategy σ˜(x). It is
measurable and we have
|γn(x, σ∗, τ)− γn(x′, σ˜∗, τ)| ≤ |Eσ∗ (γn(x, σ, τ)− γn(x′, σ˜(x), τ))|
≤ Eσ∗ (|γn(x, σ, τ)− γn(x′, σ˜(x), τ)|)
≤ ε.
If player 1 guarantees w in Γ(x) then he guarantees w− ε in the game Γ(x′) for every
x′ such that ‖x− x′‖1 ≤ η. 
5Recall that by Kuhn’s theorem, a behavioral strategy is equivalent to a mixed strategy.
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Let ε be a positive real and η be associated to ε by Lemma 5.7. We denote by
Φ(η) the set of states reachable from x1 such that there is no state x ∈ ∪|I×J |l=k Φl in the
η-neighbourhood,
Φ(η) = {x reachable from x1, ∀x′ ∈ X x′ /∈ ∪|I×J |l=k Φl or ‖x− x′‖1 > η}.
Proposition 5.8 The set Φ(η) is finite.
Proof: We first prove that there exists M such that any state in Φ(η) can be reached
in less than M stages and then we deduce that Φ(η) is finite.
For each action pair (i, j) in NC(x1), we denote by u(i, j) the integer given by
Lemma 5.3. Since there is a finite number of action pairs, there exists M ′ an integer
such that for all (i, j) ∈ NC(x1), u(i, j) ≤ M ′ and for all (i, j) ∈ C(x1), the minimal
period of (i, j) is smaller than M ′. Set M = M ′](I × J).
We prove that for all x ∈ Φ(η), t∗(x) = inf{t| ∃h ∈ (I × J)t xt(h) = x}, the least
number of stages necessary to reach x, is smaller than M .
By contradiction, let x ∈ Φ(η) such that t∗ = t∗(x) ≥ M and h be an history
associated to x and t∗, then one action pair (i∗, j∗) is repeated more than M ′ times.
This action pair is either cyclic or non-cyclic at x1. If this action pair is cyclic, the
history can be shortened, as in the proof of Proposition 5.6, which is absurd with
respect to the definition of t∗. If this action pair is non-cyclic at x1, there exists x ∈ X
such that
‖qM ′i∗,j∗x1 − x‖1 ≤ ε,
and ]C(x) > k − 1.
Denote by h′ the sequence of action pairs where (i∗, j∗) has been deleted M ′ times
from h and x′ the state obtained from x by playing h′. The transition is 1-Lipschitz
and C is non-decreasing, therefore we have
‖x− x′‖1 ≤ ε,
and ]C(x′) > k − 1,
which contradicts the definition of x.
To conclude notice that there exists a finite number of actions, therefore the set
Φ(η) is finite. 
By Proposition 5.8, the set of states, reachable from x1, and at a distance at least
η from any state with more than k cyclic action pairs, i.e. Φ(η), is finite. We denote
by q(Φ(η)) the set of all states obtained by one transition from one of these states
and, which are not already in Φ(η). The set q(Φ(η)) is finite and for each x ∈ q(Φ(η)),
there exists ξ(x) ∈ ∪|I×J |l=k Φl such that d(x, ξ(x)) ≤ η. The induction assumption
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implies therefore that the game Γ(ξ(x)) has a uniform value denoted by v∗(ξ(x)). We
define the auxiliary game Γ˙(ε, x1) as follows: the initial state is x1, the sets of actions
are I and J , the transition function and reward functions are given by:
q˙(x, i, j) =

qi,jx if x ∈ Φ(η)
x if x ∈ q(Φ(η))
x otherwise,
and g˙(x, i, j) =

g(x, i, j) if x ∈ Φ(η)
v∗(ξ(x)) if x ∈ q(Φ(η))
0 otherwise.
The sets of strategies for players 1 and 2 are the same as in the game Γ. In the game
starting at x1, all the states are in Φ(η) or q(Φ(η)). Since both sets are finite, this
game is formally a stochastic game with a finite set of states and finite sets of actions.
Therefore Γ˙(ε, x1) has a uniform value by the theorem of Mertens and Neyman [MN81].
Proposition 5.9 Γ˙(ε, x1) has a uniform value in x1 denoted by v
∗(ε)(x1).
We now prove that when ε goes to 0, the value v∗(ε)(x1) has to converge and the
limit is the uniform value of the game Γ(x1). We first prove that the value of the
auxiliary game is a good approximation to what the players can guarantee in Γ(x1).
Proposition 5.10 If player 1 can guarantee w in Γ˙(ε, x1) then he can guarantee w−3ε
in Γ(x1).
Proof: By assumption, there exists σ˙ a strategy of player 1 in Γ˙(ε, x1) and a stage
N˙ ≥ 1 such that
∀n ≥ N˙ , ∀τ˙ , γ˙n(x1, σ˙, τ˙) ≥ w − ε.
For each state x ∈ q(Φ(η)), we denote by σξ,x the strategy given by Lemma 5.7 with
respect to the point ξ(x) and to an ε-optimal strategy in Γ(ξ(x)) such that
∃N(x) ≥ 1, ∀n ≥ N(x), ∀τ, γn(x, σξ,x, τ) ≥ v∗(ξ(x))− 2ε.
Let N = max(N(x), x ∈ Φ(η)) be an upper bound.
Given an infinite play h ∈ (X × I × J)N, we denote by θ(h) the first stage where
the state is at a distance less than η from a state in ∪|I×J |l=k Φl :
θ(h) = inf
t≥1
{t|xt(h) ∈ q(Φ(η))}.
We define the strategy σ which plays optimally in Γ˙ until a state x′ ∈ q(Φ(η)) is
reached, and then optimally as if the remaining game was Γ(ξ(x′)). Formally, we have
∀n ≥ 1, σn(h) =
{
σ˙n(h) if n ≤ θ(h)− 1
σ
ξ,xθ(h)(h)
n−θ(h)+1 if n ≥ θ(h).
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We prove that σ guarantees w−3ε. Let τ be a strategy of player 2, we denote by xt the
state at stage t. Let N∗ ∈ N such that N∗ ≥ N˙ and N
N∗ ≤ ε. Fix n ≥ N∗, we separate
the histories in two groups depending on whether n−θ(h)+1 > N or n−θ(h)+1 ≤ N .
We first focus on the set of histories {h ∈ H∞, n − θ(h) + 1 > N} and notice
that on these histories the expected average payoff between θ(h) and n is close to the
uniform value at ξ(xθ(h)).
We denote by σhn and τhn the strategies induced by σ and τ given the finite history
hn. Since ‖xθ(h) − ξ(xθ(h))‖ ≤ η, we have
Ex1,σ,τ
 n∑
t=θ(h)
g(xt, it, jt)1n−θ(h)+1>N

=Ex1,σ,τ
(
γn−θ(h)+1(xθ(h), σhθ(h) , τhθ(h))(n− θ(h) + 1)1n−θ(h)+1>N
)
≥Ex1,σ,τ
((
v∗(ξ(xθ(h)))− 2ε
)
(n− θ(h) + 1)1n−θ(h)+1>N
)
.
Therefore
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ
(
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)1n−θ(h)+1>N
)
=
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ
θ(h)−1∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt) +
n∑
t=θ(h)
g(xt, it, jt)
1n−θ(h)+1>N

≥ Ex1,σ,τ
 1
n
θ(h)−1∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt) + v
∗(ξ(xθ(h)))(n− θ(h) + 1)
1n−θ(h)+1≥N − 2ε1n−θ(h)+1≥N
 .
We now consider the set of histories {h ∈ H∞, n− θ(h) + 1 ≤ N} and notice that the
payoff between θ(h) and n has a small weight. By definition on this set of histories
n− θ(h) + 1
n
≤ N
N∗
≤ ε.
Moreover we have
∀x ∈ X, ∀x′ ∈ q(Φ(η)), ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, g(x, i, j) ≥ −1 ≥ v(ξ(x′))− 2.
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It follows that
1
n
Ex1,σ,τ
(
n∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt)1n−θ(h)≤N
)
= Ex1,σ,τ
 1
n
θ(h)−1∑
n=1
g(xt, it, jt) +
n∑
t=θ(h)
g(xt, it, jt)
1n−θ(h)+1≤N

≥ Ex1,σ,τ
 1
n
θ(h)−1∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt) + v
∗(ξ(xθ(h)))(n− θ(h) + 1)− 2(n− θ(h) + 1)
1n−θ(h)+1≤N

≥ Ex1,σ,τ
 1
n
θ(h)−1∑
t=1
g(xt, it, jt) + v
∗(ξ(xθ(h)))(n− θ(h) + 1)
1n−θ(h)+1≤N − 2ε1n−θ(h)+1≤N
 .
Therefore by summing the two inequalities we get the result
γn(x1, σ, τ) ≥ γ˙n(x1, σ˙, τ)− 2ε ≥ w − 3ε.

It follows from Proposition 5.10 that for all ε > 0, player 1 can guarantee v(ε)(x1)−
3ε in the game Γ(x1). So player 1 can guarantee the superior limit when ε converges
to 0: for all δ > 0, there exists n1 and a strategy σ
∗ ∈ Σ such that for all τ ∈ T , for
all n′ ≥ n1,
γn′(x1, σ
∗, τ) ≥ lim sup
ε→0
v(ε)(x1)− δ.
The same argument shows that player 2 can guarantee the inferior limit. Therefore,
for all δ > 0, there exist n2 and a strategy τ
∗ ∈ T such that for all σ ∈ Σ, for all
n′ ≥ n2,
γn′(x1, σ, τ
∗) ≤ lim inf
ε→0
v(ε)(x1) + δ.
Given δ > 0 and n′ ≥ max(n1, n2), we have
lim sup
ε→0
v(ε)(x1)− δ ≤ γn′(x1, σ∗, τ ∗) ≤ lim inf
ε→0
v(ε)(x1) + δ.
Therefore v(ε)(x1) converges when ε goes to 0 and the limit is the uniform value of
the game Γ(x1). This proves the induction hypothesis at the next step and concludes
the proof. For all x1 ∈ X, the game Γ(x1) has a uniform value.
5.3 Proof of Corollary 3.7
In this section, we provide a short proof of Corollary 3.7. Recall that given a state-
blind repeated game Γsb = (K, I, J, q, g) with a commutative transition q, we define
the auxiliary stochastic game Ψ = (X, I, J, q˜, g˜) where X = ∆(K), q˜ is the linear
extension of q, and g˜ is the linear extension of g.
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In this framework deducing the existence of the uniform value in the original re-
peated game from the existence of the uniform value in the auxiliary game is easy
since the sets of strategies are almost the same in the two games. A player can use a
strategy of the repeated game Γ in Ψ by looking only at the actions played and recip-
rocally a player can use a strategy of the stochastic game Ψ in the repeated game Γ
by completing the sequence of actions with the unique sequence of compatible beliefs.
Proof: The set of strategies in the game Γsb are respectively denoted by Σsb and T sb.
We will denote in this proof the payoff in the n stage game by γsbn and the value of the
n-stage game by vsbn (p1) for all n ≥ 1.
We denote by H˜t the set of histories in Ψ of length t, by Σ˜ the set of strategies of
player 1, and by T˜ the set of strategies of player 2. Let p1 ∈ ∆(K), σ˜ ∈ Σ˜ and τ˜ ∈ T˜ .
The payoff in the n-stage game, starting from p1 and given that the players follow σ˜
and τ˜ , is denoted by γ˜n(δp1 , σ˜, τ˜) and the value by wn(p1). The set X is compact, g˜
is continuous and the transition q˜ is commutative and deterministic, so we can apply
Theorem 3.6 to Ψ. We denote by w∗(p1) the uniform value. The values of both games
coincide since the payoff and strategy sets coincide up to the following identification.
We focus on the case of player 1 since the situation is symmetric for player 2. Let
σsb be a strategy in Σsb, then it defines naturally a strategy σ˜ in Σ˜ by forgetting the
states. If we denote by Πt the projection from H˜t on H
sb
t that keeps only the actions:
for all t ≥ 1, we define
σ˜(h˜t) = σ
sb(Πt(h˜t)).
Reciprocally for all t ≥ 1, given a sequence of actions hsbt = (i1, j1, ...it, jt), the com-
pletion Ξt(hsb) in H˜t is the unique sequence such that p1 is fixed and for all t ≥ 1,
q(pt, it, jt) = pt+1. Let σ˜ be a strategy in Σ˜, then we define the strategy σ
sb by
completing the history: for all t ≥ 1
σsb(hsbt ) = σ˜(Ξ
t(hsbt )).
A similar procedure gives two functions between the sets of strategies of player 2.
Given σ˜ ∈ Σ˜ and τ sb ∈ T sb, set σsb ∈ Σsb and τ˜ ∈ T˜ as in the previous paragraph.
By definition of q˜, the state at stage t in Ψ under Pδp,σ˜,τ˜ is equal to the law of the
state in Γsb under Pp,σsb,τsb . Therefore for all n ≥ 1, we have
γsbn (p1, σ
sb, τ sb) = γ˜n(δp1 , σ˜, τ˜).
Finally, let ε > 0, σ˜ be an ε-optimal strategy in Ψ and N ≥ 1 an integer such that
for all τ˜ ∈ T˜ ,
γ˜n(δp1 , σ˜, τ˜) ≥ w∗(p1)− ε,
then for all τ sb ∈ T sb, we have
γsbn (p1, σ
sb, τ sb) = γ˜n(δp1 , σ˜, τ˜)
≥ w∗(p1)− ε.
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The strategy σsb guarantees w∗(p1)− ε and therefore player 1 guarantees w∗(p1). By
symmetry, player 2 guarantees w∗(p1) and the game Γsb(p1) has a uniform value equal
to w∗(p1). 
5.4 Extensions.
The proof of Theorem 3.6 can be extended by replacing some of the lemmas with more
general results. The result of Sine [Sin90], for example, applies to more general norms
than the norm ‖.‖1.
Definition 5.11 A norm on Rn is polyhedral if the unit ball has a finite number of
extreme points.
For example the norm ‖.‖1 and the sup norm are polyhedral norms but not the Eu-
clidean norm. For polyhedral norm, the application of the theorem of Sine [Sin90] to
compact sets gives the following results,
Lemma 5.12 Let N(.) be a polyhedral norm and K ⊂ Rm be a compact set. There
exists ϕ(N,m) ∈ N such that for all functions T , 1-Lipschtiz for N , there exists
t ≤ ϕ(N,m) such that (T tn)n∈N converges.
We deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 5.13 Let Γ = (X, I, J, q, g) be a stochastic game, such that X is a compact
set of Rm, I and J are finite sets, q is commutative deterministic 1-Lipschitz for a
polyhedral norm, and g is continuous. For all z1 ∈ ∆f (X), the stochastic game Γ(z1)
has a uniform value.
This theorem does not apply to Example 2.3 on the circle and the existence of a
uniform value in this model is still an open question.
We can obtain new results on non zero-sum stochastic games by replacing the
theorem from Mertens and Neyman [MN81] with other existence results. First, Vieille
[Vie00a][Vie00b] proves the existence of an equilibrium payoff in every two-player
stochastic games. So our proof, adapted to the non zero-sum case leads to the following
result.
Theorem 5.14 Let Γ = (X, I, J, q, g1, g2) be a two-player non zero-sum stochastic
game such that X is a compact subset of Rm, I and J are finite sets of actions, q is
commutative deterministic 1-Lipschitz for ‖.‖1 and g1 and g2 are continuous. Then,
for all z1 ∈ ∆f (X), the stochastic game Γ(z1) has an equilibrium payoff.
Secondly, there exist some specific classes of m-player stochastic games where the
existence of an equilibrium has been proven. For example, Flesch, Schoenmakers and
Vrieze [FSV08][FSV09] prove the existence of an equilibrium for m-player stochastic
games where each player controls a finite Markov chain and the payoffs depend on
the m states and the m actions at stage n. Note that the commutativity assumption
here is reduced to a condition player by player. As in our proof, the commutativity
assumption implies that we can study deterministic transitions 1-Lipschitz for the
norm ‖.‖1.
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Theorem 5.15 Let Γ =
(
(Xj, Ij, qj)j∈{1,...,m}, g
)
be a m-player product-state space
stochastic game such that for all j ∈ {1, ...,m}, Xj is a compact subset of Rmj , Ij
is a finite set of actions, qj is commutative deterministic 1-Lipschitz for ‖.‖1 and
g :
∏
(Xj × Ij) → [0, 1]m is continuous. For all z1 ∈ ∆f (
∏
j Xj), the stochastic game
Γ(z1) has an equilibrium payoff.
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